242 e lusive v ictories
Eager, even desperate, for positive news, the Johnson administration
boasted of turning the corner. To sell the claim of signifi cant progress,
the administration decided to use its fi eld commander as a political
pawn. Westmoreland was brought home to speak to Congress and the
press about the turnabout. He suggested that if the trends continued,
American forces might begin to withdraw within two years, turning
over the war to the South Vietnamese. In a speech to the National
Press Club on November 21, 1967, he went so far as to declare that the
enemy was now losing the war. Johnson repeated this optimistic
refrain before friendly audiences, pleased at last to answer the naysayers
on both fl anks. Public opinion polls showed that the message had been
received: approval of the war and the president’s performance both
rebounded (though the results were short-lived). Westmoreland and
other administration spokesmen warned that the communists might
yet stage a major attack, but the cautionary words were lost amid the
broader upbeat message.
Th e administration thus staked its credibility—already left in doubt
by previous misstatements and exaggerations—on a very fragile foun-
dation. Should the enemy show greater resilience than offi cial U.S.
pronouncements implied, the blow to the president and to his fi eld
commander would be severe. And even the administration understood
the possibility that the reported battlefi eld gains were but temporary. As
Johnson himself had observed several times, nothing seemed to prevent
Hanoi from increasing its infiltration rate to offset losses or match
American troop increases.
Th e communists meanwhile had decided to pursue a radical strategic
departure. Although Hanoi believed the Americans would eventually
tire as had the French and seek a face-saving political accommodation
that would pave the way for reunifi cation of the nation, signifi cant
elements within the Politburo (the communist leadership body) pressed
for a more rapid successful conclusion to the war. Th e heavy casualties
inflicted by American firepower took their toll on morale among
fi ghting troops—even highly dedicated soldiers get discouraged when
they see no evident gains from their sacrifi ces. Some senior commu-
nists, including the military commander in the South, General Nguyen
Th ich Th anh, decided that it made more sense to focus on the Saigon
government as the point of vulnerability. Attacks in the Central