s taying the c ourse 243Highlands of South Vietnam and along the Cambodian border would
first draw away American troops from population centers. Then,
through nationwide attacks on South Vietnamese cities, communist
forces, led by indigenous VC mainforce and part-time troops, would
spark a popular uprising that would topple the “puppet” regime.
Without a Saigon government to defend, the Americans would have no
choice but to depart quickly. Other communist leaders, among them
the redoubtable General Giap, questioned the wisdom of a general
offensive in the face of obvious American advantages in firepower.
Despite these reservations and Th anh’s death from wounds suff ered
during an American air attack in mid-1967, plans proceeded for the
sequence of attacks that would culminate in the general offensive
during the Tet holiday at the end of January 1968.
Tet represented a bold military gamble, even a reckless one. Th e
off ensive violated the basic military principle of concentration of eff ort.
Individual attacks, even if temporarily successful, could be defeated in
detail (that is, one by one) by a foe, the U.S. military, which enjoyed
superior mobility and could assemble more quickly. Unless the attacks
sparked a massive popular uprising from a largely apathetic or cautious
population and toppled the Saigon government in short order, the par-
ticipating VC forces would be exposed, isolated, and vulnerable. If they
were defeated, moreover, it would take years to rebuild them, while the
Saigon government would have an opportunity to solidify its control
over the population. Only with great reluctance (and possibly under
enormous political pressure from others in the Politburo) did Giap
accede to the scheme. ^
A further danger lay in the possibility that detailed orders for the
off ensive would fall into American and South Vietnamese hands, giving
them time to prepare. In fact, communist plans were captured, so
American intelligence knew that a major attack was pending, which led
to the public warnings by Westmoreland and others. What the Ameri-
cans learned about the off ensive, however, made it seem so misguided
that they discounted the authenticity of the information.
At a high price in casualties, the communists succeeded in setting the
stage for the Tet Off ensive. Attacks on isolated outposts near the demil-
itarized zone (DMZ) dividing North and South Vietnam and along the
Laotian and Cambodian borders in fall 1967 drew the attention of