s taying the c ourse 245civilians in an attempt at political intimidation that backfi red. ARVN
forces, with American air support, also fought stoutly.
As Giap and other doubters of the Tet strategy had feared, the
off ensive depended too heavily on optimistic assumptions and left com-
munist forces fighting on exactly the terms the American military
preferred. The entire plan was grounded more in the ideology of
people’s war than a sober assessment of political realities. Most South
Vietnamese civilians were simply waiting to see which side would
prevail. Contrary to expectations that the demoralized South Viet-
namese military would welcome the opportunity to eject its American
overlords, no ARVN units switched sides. Urban warfare also left com-
munist forces far from their sanctuaries. All along, American tactics had
sought to draw VC/NVA regulars out into the open, where massive
U.S. fi repower could infl ict crippling losses. Viet Cong troops in the
Tet attacks suff ered especially heavy casualties—more than half of their
committed forces—from which they would never recover. After the
off ensive, North Vietnamese soldiers made up the bulk of nominal VC
units for the remainder of the war.
For the Johnson administration, the Tet Off ensive became a debacle
of a different sort. The first video images and photographs of the
attacks, especially the abortive assault on the American embassy,
pointed up the continuing enemy capacity to strike anywhere in South
Vietnam. A carefully crafted narrative of steady progress collapsed over-
night, victim of its own overselling. Th e indiscriminate use of air
strikes in built-up areas also backfi red in the public relations war. When
bombing leveled Ben Tre to beat off a communist assault, an American
offi cer told reporter Peter Arnett, “It became necessary to destroy the
town in order to save it.” The quote took on iconic status as an
expression of the self-defeating character of the American war eff ort.
Damaged beyond repair, too, was the reputation of General West-
moreland, who had been thrust (however reluctantly) into the role of
administration propagandist. Even as he accurately announced that the
communist attacks had been defeated, few were listening. Moreover,
intelligence reports made clear that many of the Tet attackers had come
from the very categories Westmoreland and his MACV staff had sought
to exclude from the enemy order of battle. Success also came at a heavy
cost: in one week in mid-February, American forces suff ered more than