246 e lusive v ictories
3,000 casualties, the highest one-week total of the war. Westmoreland
was soon “kicked upstairs” to become Army Chief of Staff , a promotion
that fooled no one, and replaced by his deputy, General Creighton
Abrams.
Th e political fallout was immediate. American public opinion, which
had started to turn against Johnson and the war again after the fall 1967
uptick, continued on its downward course, with presidential approval
falling to 41 percent in February. By early March, a Gallup survey
reported that only one in three Americans believed the United States
was making progress in Vietnam. Two events confi rmed the degree of
media and public disillusionment with the war. On February 27, 1968,
CBS anchor Walter Cronkite—the “most trusted man in America”—
declared the war a stalemate, an announcement even the president
knew marked a turning point from which there could be no recovery.
Two weeks later, on March 13, Senator Eugene McCarthy came within
a handful of votes of defeating Johnson in the New Hampshire Demo-
cratic primary. McCarthy drew stronger support from hawks than those
who favored a U.S. withdrawal—clear evidence that the administration
position had been repudiated on both fl anks. His strong showing
prompted another candidate with broad appeal, Robert F. Kennedy, to
enter the race. Communist strategy had always treated public opinion
as a vulnerable point in the American war effort. Although the Tet
Off ensive failed to bring down the Saigon regime, the aftershocks in the
United States confi rmed Hanoi’s political insight.
Th e Tet Off ensive had far-reaching repercussions for American war
policy and the president who directed it. Once again, military com-
manders urged extensive reinforcements, initially because the situation
was still dangerous and, later, to capitalize on the enemy’s defeat.
General Wheeler, who asked in late February to reinforce MACV with
another 206,000 troops, hoped the request would fi nally compel the
president to mobilize the reserves. Before Johnson would decide, he
asked Clark Cliff ord, who recently had replaced McNamara as defense
secretary, to review U.S. policy options. Unlike his predecessor, Cliff ord
enjoyed a strong position with the military: he was a longtime Johnson
ally and, despite voicing early doubts about the wisdom of American
intervention, had been a loyal, even hawkish backer of the president on
the war. But his post-Tet assessment led him to recommend a sharp