s taying the c ourse 259behalf of what he famously termed “the silent majority” of Americans
who wanted to see the war concluded honorably. Polls showed that
public approval for the president’s war policy had soared from 58
percent to 77 percent. It seemed an opportune moment, then, to act
aggressively on the battlefi eld. Apart from the military argument for
attacking the sanctuaries, Nixon seemed to personalize the challenge
they presented—as though the communist troops, by hiding behind an
international boundary they felt free to disregard, were thumbing their
nose at him. Th us he spoke of how failing to respond would make it
appear that the United States had become “a pitiful, helpless giant.”
Again Laird found himself in opposition to a major policy decision on
the war and again he was overruled.
Politics would also shape what the cross-border assault sought to
accomplish and determine when it ended. Abrams wanted to advance
far into Cambodia and to remain there for several months to ensure
that the enemy’s logistical base was destroyed. Th is would delay any
communist plans for another major off ensive in South Vietnam, leaving
a breathing space for progress on Vietnamization and further American
troop withdrawals. Instead the president stated the operation was
designed to destroy the communist headquarters for the war, the
Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Abrams and MACV
knew that this enemy organization was widely dispersed and mobile,
which meant there was virtually no chance that it could be located and
destroyed. Despite the fi eld commander’s cautions, pressure came from
above (specifi cally, Al Haig) to destroy COSVN.
Th e attack aroused fi erce protests on college campuses across the
country, including demonstrations that resulted in the shooting deaths
of students at Kent State and Jackson State universities by the National
Guard. With the nation again seeming on the verge of splitting apart at
the seams, the White House fl inched: Nixon limited the depth of the
incursion to thirty kilometers and announced that all American and
ARVN troops would leave Cambodia by the end of June. Th is was far
sooner than MACV had intended, and it assured that the incursion
would have few long-term military benefi ts. Abrams ruefully conceded
that the entire operation had done little more than cause the enemy
“some temporary inconvenience.” Worse yet, no longer confi dent that
their border sanctuaries were secure, the communists moved much