260 e lusive v ictories
deeper into Cambodia. Th is marked the fi rst step into the heart of the
nation for the Cambodian communist insurgents, the Khmer Rouge, a
course that would ultimately spell tragedy.
Lam Son 719, the ambitious 1971 operation to sever communist
supply lines through Laos, was a third White House–inspired initiative.
Here, too, the idea had been around for years, because aerial inter-
diction, even with refi ned techniques, could at best slow the movement
of men and materiel south from the DRV. By the time the NSC
planners embraced the concept, however, the circumstances made it a
much riskier proposition. In the aftermath of the 1970 Cambodian
attack, Congress had passed legislation, the Cooper-Church
Amendment, banning the use of funds for American military personnel
in Laos or Cambodia. Th e White House insisted on going ahead with
the Laotian attack anyway, but it directed the Pentagon to plan an
ARVN-only aff air. (Haig’s opinions on how to conduct the war evi-
dently counted for more with the president at this point than did those
of either Abrams or the JCS.) U.S. forces would provide long-range
artillery support from within South Vietnam and air support. Once
South Vietnamese troops crossed into Laos, though, they would be on
their own, not even accompanied by their American advisors. Th is was
precisely the kind of operation for which the ARVN had not been
prepared. Abrams faced the task of inducing President Th ieu to coop-
erate, which he did with considerable reluctance and only for as long as
absolutely necessary. When the operation ended, badly, Kissinger and
Haig sought to pin the blame on Abrams and MACV.
Fear that South Vietnam might collapse—and cost him reelection—
provoked Nixon to order another military operation in late spring 1972.
The American military command voiced alarm that ARVN forces
might break under the severe pressure of the communist Easter
Offensive. By this point, with American forces in South Vietnam
reduced to fewer than 100,000 troops, the president’s options were
limited. Even though Hanoi had virtually denuded the DRV of troops
to throw everything into the attack, an American countermove into
North Vietnam above the 17th parallel was not possible. Setting aside
the practicalities of quickly amassing the needed forces, such an action
would reverse Vietnamization and amount to an admission that it had
failed. Nixon instead ordered intensive bombing of North Vietnam,