s taying the c ourse 261including military options Johnson had rejected—air raids on transpor-
tation lines up to the Chinese border and the mining of all North Viet-
namese ports, including Haiphong. He calculated correctly that his
recent overtures toward Beijing and Moscow would stop them from
intervening directly. Th e NVA off ensive was beaten back, after the com-
munist forces lost more than 50 percent of the 200,000 troops com-
mitted, a staggering casualty rate. Although the heavy bombing of
North Vietnam impeded Hanoi’s resupply efforts, the decisive air
strikes were tactical raids in the South in support of the ARVN defenses
and counterattacks. However, notwithstanding the terrible cost the
communists paid, NVA troops retained control of signifi cant territory
within South Vietnam near the DMZ, in the Central Highlands, and
along the Cambodian border. Th is strategic gain would prove impor-
tant in the ongoing peace talks and beyond.
On the whole, Nixon’s episodic eff orts to direct military operations
proved ineff ective, sometimes even counterproductive. He showed no
better appreciation of the enemy’s determination than Johnson had.
That the secret air raids in Cambodia yielded no progress in Paris
should not have surprised the president and Kissinger: if bombing the
DRV had not forced Hanoi to bow to American military might, there
was no reason to expect better results from bombing the jungles of
Cambodia. Whatever the temporary military gains from the spring
1970 Cambodia incursion, moreover, they did not nearly off set the
political turmoil at home.
Th e administration also showed a poor grasp of the limits of Viet-
namization. Despite ample warnings from Abrams and MACV that the
ARVN on its own should not be expected to undertake a major
off ensive operation into heavily defended enemy territory, the adminis-
tration pressed ahead with Lam Son 719. Th e results did little for the
confidence of President Thieu and his army. Nixon showed a will-
ingness to expand the scope of military operations in the war, including
a resumption of bombing of the DRV in response to the 1972 NVA
off ensive that included the mining of the port of Haiphong. But for all
his keenness to shed restraints, he had no more to show for it than
Johnson did. Th e gains achieved by Laird and Abrams through Viet-
namization were dissipated by ill-conceived, politically misguided
White House interventions.