s taying the c ourse 263support. Even after the American withdrawal was complete, then,
South Vietnam would need not just munitions on a vast scale but also,
if attacked again by the North, a resumption of U.S. bombing.
Past confl icts pointed up the peace-building dilemma confronting
the Nixon administration. Weary of the sacrifi ces of war, the public
refocuses on domestic concerns when the fi ghting ends. Any signifi cant
ongoing postwar involvement requires careful political groundwork.
Neither Lincoln nor Wilson had managed the challenge eff ectively,
postponing peace-building eff orts until it was too late. Roosevelt had
done somewhat better at the end of the Second World War with the
well-orchestrated campaign to establish the United Nations. When he
entered the White House in 1969, Nixon had inherited a situation in
which no real planning had been done for the postwar future of South-
east Asia, and conditions at home were not the least bit promising for
securing a long-term commitment to Saigon. With the drawdown of
American forces and the decline in American casualties, people back
home turned their backs on Vietnam. Popular protests weakened after
the spring 1970 domestic upheaval, aided by the end of the draft, yet
the war still became less popular over time. By the end of 1971, polls
showed that other issues had eclipsed Vietnam in the public mind;
Americans were nearly three times as likely to identify the economy as
their major source of concern.
Congress had also rejected the war, though legislative expressions of
disapproval initially took a merely symbolic form. For example, the
Senate repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution during the 1970 Cambodia
incursion, knowing full well that this would not infl uence the course of
American policy. Th e real power of the legislative branch lay in its
control over appropriations. However, so long as American troops
fought in Vietnam, Congress would not terminate funding for the war.
Th e reason was political. Lawmakers would not wish to face accusations
that they had abandoned U.S. troops, even in an unpopular war.
Nevertheless, Congress began to apply pressure. Lawmakers introduced
measures to restrict American military operations, including the with-
drawal of all American forces from South Vietnam by a specifi ed date
(the end of 1970). Unsuccessful in the initial legislative skirmishes,
proponents like Senators Frank Church and George McGovern kept at
it, capitalizing on the sizable Democratic majorities in both chambers.