s taying the c ourse 269via intermediaries and in letters directly to Thieu in the preceding
weeks, Nixon had vowed to continue backing South Vietnam when the
communists violated the pending agreement. When Saigon emissaries
asked for something in the agreement to establish a legal basis for
American retaliatory action, however, he brushed aside such language
as unnecessary. He knew full well that by that point Congress would
never go along with an open-ended commitment to send bombers back
to Vietnam. Saigon would have to trust his word, and by unleashing
air attacks of unprecedented ferocity he showed that he meant business.
However, even as the bombs fell, American offi cials told Th ieu that they
expected the communists to return to the table soon and conclude an
agreement much like the one the two sides had arrived at in October.
Th e South Vietnamese leader had played his last hand, and it was a
weak one. He failed to force a North Vietnamese withdrawal, his
essential objective. For minimal and meaningless changes in the terms
of the deal, Nixon had infl icted signifi cant civilian casualties (Hanoi
claimed that over 1,600 civilians had been killed) and caused serious
losses in American aircraft (15 B-52s were either shot down or crashed)
and their crews. On January 23, 1973, Kissinger and Th o signed the
peace agreement that brought to a close American involvement in
the war.
Final Reckoning
To the surprise of no one, the Paris accords never brought a day of
peace to Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger had evinced little interest in the
implementation and enforcement arrangements, a clear indication they
expected fi ghting to continue. As the time for the cease-fi re approached,
both Thieu and the communist leadership ordered their respective
forces to launch attacks to improve their positions. Th ieu also ignored
language in the agreement that called for the release of civilian detainees,
choosing instead to follow Kissinger’s advice that he use them as hos-
tages to bargain for NVA troop withdrawals. (Why either one might
have expected Hanoi to give up a key military advantage in exchange
for captive VC cadre remains a puzzle, given the communists’
cold-blooded willingness to sacrifi ce lives for their cause.) For their
part, the North Vietnamese moved immediately to reinforce their units