270 e lusive v ictories
in the South, also violating the agreement terms that permitted no
more than replacement of troops and worn-out equipment. Th ieu and
his government accordingly felt no compunction about ignoring the
provisions that called for elections and a political settlement. Only the
provisions calling for a fi nal American troop withdrawal and the return
of American POWs were carried out completely. More people died in
fi ghting in South Vietnam in 1973 than in any year of the war. ^
Nixon refused to make good on his private assurances to Th ieu to
punish North Vietnamese violations through stern military action.
Various excuses were off ered by the White House and other American
offi cials—the United States did not wish to jeopardize the return of the
later batches of American POWs, the onset of the rainy season would
lessen NVA infi ltration, bombing attacks again would merely impede
enemy reinforcement, and so on. Over the course of the year, more-
over, the Watergate investigations started to close in on the president.
Kissinger and Nixon later claimed that Watergate made it impossible
for the president to honor his private pledges to Thieu. But even
without political scandal, public and congressional support for renewed
intervention would have been absent. A defi nitive legislative ban on a
resumption of military action was therefore inevitable, Watergate or no.
In August 1973, Congress barred the use of force in Vietnam, nullifying
any promise Nixon had made to Th ieu.
Th e fi nal chapter came with the abrupt collapse of the Saigon gov-
ernment in spring 1975. By that point Nixon had been forced from
offi ce, Congress had reduced aid to the South Vietnamese military to
levels below what it needed to maintain itself at full strength, and
Hanoi had rebuilt its forces (though not quite to the level of the 1972
Easter Off ensive). Th e North Vietnamese became confi dent they would
win when Nixon resigned, seeing his successor, Gerald R. Ford, as a
weak leader. When Ford did not respond to the NVA capture of Phuoc
Long province in South Vietnam in early 1975, Hanoi realized it could
launch a broad off ensive without fear of American retaliation. Th ieu
had made the communists’ military task easier through his stubborn
refusal to surrender territory to concentrate his forces. Although the
attacking units were weaker than in 1972, the ARVN command again
faltered and South Vietnamese morale, no longer backed by American
muscle, broke. Congress refused a last-gasp request from the Ford