272 e lusive v ictories
historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. Excesses there were, including
domestic espionage against political foes, illegal surveillance, eff orts to
harass war opponents by misusing government agencies for political
purposes, and the other abuses that culminated in Watergate. Ulti-
mately, Congress tried to regain some control over the decision to go to
war by passing the 1973 War Powers Resolution. It was designed to force
a president to seek legislative approval when sending American troops
into harm’s way. Few advocates of the resolution acknowledged that
intervention in Vietnam had occurred with the full consent of Congress
in 1964 and enjoyed broad public backing at the outset.
Despite the focus on presidential overreach, the Vietnam confl ict
really highlighted how little presidents can do to shape what happens in
a war. Critics scarcely noticed that both presidents quickly dissipated
their power. Johnson never asserted control over the war, even in the
initial phase when presidents historically have exercised the greatest
direction over military matters. Nixon on taking offi ce did recover a
degree of latitude. However, obsessed with showing how tough he was,
he missed the brief opportunity he had to build a durable American
security commitment to South Vietnam. For peace-building, he off ered
a mixture of secrecy (his private word to Th ieu to meet communist
transgressions with force) and cynicism (did he really believe Congress
would support recurrent bombing?). It was an exit strategy that refl ected
the exhaustion of presidential war power, not its imperial apogee.