t he p erils of o ptimism 275and extensive diplomacy, the Bush administration also assembled a
broad multinational coalition and secured the approval of the United
Nations for military action if Saddam refused to withdraw from Kuwait.
After negotiation and sanctions failed to bring about an Iraqi pullback,
the administration decided it had no alternative but to use force to
liberate Kuwait, a course narrowly approved by Congress. Bush made
clear that the United States hoped to go beyond restoring Kuwait’s
independence to eliminate Iraq as a threat to peace in the Gulf region
and the Middle East—a signal that the administration would welcome
“regime change” in Baghdad.
For diplomatic reasons, however, the United States could not
explicitly pursue this broader objective. Just as importantly, American
leaders had no wish to become responsible for governing a postwar
Iraq that might prove highly unstable. Washington hoped instead
that once Saddam Hussein’s army was crushed on the battlefield
(especially the dictator’s most loyal force, the Republican Guard), his
military might turn against him or the Iraqi people rise up and over-
throw him.
To the disappointment of the Bush administration, the rout of
Saddam’s army in Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm did not precip-
itate his ouster. Coalition forces scored an overwhelming triumph in a
mere four days after their ground off ensive commenced on February 22,
- Most of the Republican Guard troops, though, escaped back to
Iraq. Further, Washington allowed the commander on the scene,
Schwarzkopf, to negotiate cease-fi re terms, and he permitted the Iraqi
military to continue to fl y helicopter missions. When the anticipated
popular uprisings against Saddam erupted, the dictator used his heli-
copters and loyal troops to crush them. Th e United States intervened
quickly in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from reprisal attacks,
establishing an autonomous zone under American protection. Else-
where, however, coalition forces stood by as Iraqi troops suppressed
rebellious elements and killed all those suspected of supporting or sym-
pathizing with the opposition. Th e violence took on a sectarian cast:
Saddam’s regime drew its support from Iraq’s Sunni minority, while the
resistance was based primarily in the majority Shiite community, mainly
around Basra in the South. Saddam Hussein concluded from the
decision of American leaders not to pursue his forces all the way to