t he p erils of o ptimism 277region, especially to Israel, and as a criminal who had used WMD on
his own people. Infl uential “neocons” such as Paul Wolfowitz urged a
shift in American policy to support eff orts to bring about regime change
in Iraq. In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) that
declared the United States should back efforts to remove Saddam’s
regime and promote a democratic government in its place. Because the
legislation did not commit the United States to a specifi c course of
action, President Clinton signed the bill, thereby avoiding the political
attacks he might have incurred through a veto. Th e Clinton adminis-
tration, though it knew that Saddam was sidestepping UN sanctions,
did not see Iraq as a major source of terrorism and chose not to engage
in more aggressive action against Baghdad. Other threats were more
alarming, notably Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network.
With the election of President George W. Bush in 2000, advocates of
regime change moved closer to the seat of power, but American policy
toward Iraq did not immediately change. Several leading neoconserva-
tives assumed important second-tier positions within the adminis-
tration; Wolfowitz, for example, became deputy secretary of defense for
policy. He and a few others proposed that the United States back regime
change “at a distance,” that is, by supporting Iraqi insurgents and exile
groups that might weaken Saddam Hussein, possibly even letting the
Shiite south break away from Baghdad’s control. Neither the new pres-
ident nor his senior offi cials endorsed more direct measures against
Saddam. ^ Secretary of State Colin Powell, Vice President Dick Cheney,
and others had backed the 1991 decision not to press the coalition
off ensive to the point of overthrowing the dictator, lest the United
States become too deeply enmeshed in the political fate of a post-
Saddam Iraq. Although Cheney later concluded it had been an error to
let Saddam remain in power, he still did not endorse military action to
remove him. Despite impatience with containment, then, the Bush
administration initially continued the policy.
Th e terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, abruptly transformed
the policy calculus. Bush resolved at once to remove the threat of future
attacks. Over the following days, Wolfowitz urged the president to
send a strong signal of his commitment to stop terrorism by pursuing
regime change in Baghdad. However, all signs suggested that 9/11 had
been the handiwork of bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and they were being