280 e lusive v ictories
had closer ties to known terrorist networks than did Iraq. Even allowing
for the heightened sensitivity to catastrophic terrorist attacks expressed
by Vice President Cheney and others, Iraq represented a curious choice
as the next administration target.
But dealing a fatal blow to Saddam Hussein held other appeal. Iraq lay
at the heart of the strategic Middle East, and the possibility of trans-
forming the country into a free society with democratic and market insti-
tutions captured the imagination of the president and those around him.
If Iraq could be remade, the eff ects might be felt across the region. For the
fi rst time, the Arab world would see a successful liberal alternative to either
the stagnant authoritarian regimes that predominated or the backward-
looking fundamentalist orders that Islamic extremists sought to promote.
Realist caution had guided past American policy to a dead-end: the United
States had propped up dictatorships in the name of stability. Now, with
American power at its peak and the world recoiling from the terrorist
agenda after 9/11, the opportunity beckoned to set in motion a diff erent
dynamic that might usher in a new era of liberation. As one critic later
said of the administration’s view, “Iraq was a blank slate on which the
United States could impose its vision of a pluralistic society.” Other
rogue states would get the message, too. Last, taking down Saddam’s
regime would resonate with an American people still reeling from 9/11—
better by far to strike a blow against an avowed enemy of the United States
than to sit back and await the next act of terrorist violence.
It was all heady stuff , and certainly plausible on the surface. Bush
saw himself standing at a crossroads, a rare moment when a political
leader seems to have within his grasp the opportunity to alter the course
of history. Th e circumstances created by 9/11, he believed, might allow
for more than a conventional defensive response to extremists. But the
very boldness of the emerging administration agenda also demanded
close critical scrutiny. Questions needed to be asked about every
assumption undergirding the transformative aspiration—about the real
nature of Iraqi society that was deemed ripe for a liberal remaking,
about whether democracy could be implanted quickly, about the
agendas of diff erent Iraqi actors both within Iraq and in exile, about
how other regional actors might exploit a power vacuum created by a
weakened Iraq, and more. In short, the situation begged for a rigorous,
structured decision process, one designed to compensate for the