20 e lusive v ictories
as George H.W. Bush learned after his overwhelming triumph in the
1991 Gulf War could not be translated into reelection a year later.
Still, the prospect of a popular backlash has not prevented presidents
from committing the United States to armed confl ict. Presidents rarely
expect war to be long and costly (with the exception of the two world
wars). Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, as the margin of American
military superiority over potential adversaries widened and the United
States fought brief, seemingly eff ective campaigns with low casualties in
Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo, it became
easier for presidents to conclude that the vast American technological
advantage had reduced the political downside of using force. The
United States fought in six signifi cant confl icts between 1945 and 1989;
the number rose to nine between 1989 and 2003. No confl ict seemed
likely to last long enough for political opposition to coalesce.
It is also less likely today that presidents will be deterred from mil-
itary action by other countries. In the aftermath of World War II, when
the United States faced a hostile Soviet Union, presidents had to con-
sider that any large-scale military action in one theater might leave
America and its allies dangerously vulnerable elsewhere. Presidents also
calculated that a limited war might become a global conflagration
should intervention go beyond what the Soviets were prepared to tol-
erate. Th us Harry Truman refused to widen the Korean confl ict, despite
the importuning of his battlefield commander, General Douglas
MacArthur, and pressure from conservatives at home. Th e end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 put an end to
such concerns.
From Wars between States to Asymmetric Warfare. Th e United States
emerged as the world’s foremost military power at a time when warfare
assumed a particular form—immensely destructive contests between
industrialized states. To achieve their political goals through military
confl icts, such states would mobilize their economic resources, fi eld
mass armies and equip them with heavy armaments, and seek to smash
completely their enemies’ capability to wage war on the same terms.
Although rarely admitted, civilians, essential cogs in the enemies’ pro-
duction processes, were treated as targets, and noncombatant losses
became a necessary evil. For the United States, the Civil War was the
fi rst confl ict to take on the characteristics of modern industrial warfare,