t he p erils of o ptimism 281president’s own professed shoot-from-the-hip, instinctive leadership
style. But the following months would show that no such decision
process existed within the Bush administration.
Although blame for the process deficiencies has been placed on
various officials, ultimate responsibility rested with the president
himself. It is certainly true that Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s national
security advisor, failed to play the role of an “honest broker” who would
make certain that her boss heard confl icting viewpoints and understood
the risks of war and its aftermath. Instead, she tended to tell the pres-
ident what he wanted to hear. Vice President Cheney enjoyed an
outsized role in the administration that he used to promote his con-
viction—despite the lack of evidence, then and now—that Saddam
Hussein had an active connection to al-Qaeda. But these and other
key subordinates had been chosen because they embraced Bush’s view
of the world, and he did not invite those around him to question his
commitment.
Th e outliers in the administration who worried over the unexamined
drift toward war with Iraq, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell,
found themselves marginalized in the process. They would make
themselves heard, as George Ball had voiced his reservations about
Vietnam escalation to Lyndon Johnson. Powell pressed his concerns
forcefully enough to slow the timetable for military action. However,
when a president signals that he has resolved on a course of action and
asks his key subordinates to support him, few will risk their positions to
stand in opposition. In the end, Powell and nearly all the other doubters
swallowed their reservations. ^
Th e Bush administration invested its energy, then, in building a case
against Saddam Hussein that would justify regime change. Since the
president and his team believed the Iraqi dictator posed a danger
because he might share WMD with terrorist groups, much of the eff ort
went into demonstrating that he possessed unconventional weapons
and that his regime had strong ties to Islamic extremists. Neither claim
would be easy to substantiate. Not only had UN weapons inspections
ceased in 1998, but American intelligence services lacked credible
sources within Iraq. Th is left the intelligence community dependent
upon Iraqi exiles, who naturally wanted to encourage the United States
to overthrow Saddam. Th e Central Intelligence Agency also found