286 e lusive v ictories
defense deluged the Pentagon with his “snowfl akes,” memos demanding
explanations or justification for anything that struck him as symp-
tomatic of the old way of conducting business. Some senior offi cers
wilted under his incessant pressure. Others expected to outlast him,
however, knowing that few cabinet secretaries stay in offi ce more than
a couple of years. So Rumsfeld leveraged his control over senior per-
sonnel decisions to induce cooperation. As under McNamara a gener-
ation before, Rumsfeld tied career advancement to support for his
program of military transformation. ^
The first key test of the new approach to warfare came with the
campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld wanted to
mount an operation within days or weeks, only to fi nd that General
Franks and CENTCOM envisioned a lengthy buildup of conventional
forces that would require months. By contrast, the CIA was able to
place its operatives in the fi eld with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance
virtually overnight. Rumsfeld harangued Franks to accelerate the
deployment timetable and rely on Special Operations military per-
sonnel. It took just a few weeks for the CIA/Northern Alliance/special
ops/air power combination to disrupt the Taliban regime and compel it
to quit Kabul. Th e operation demonstrated the new mode of warfare
that Rumsfeld took to be the wave of the future. A number of high-
ranking offi cers were not so sure. Th ey worried that the military leaders
charged with overall direction of the campaign had focused on short-
run objectives that led them to mistake capturing the capital city
(Kabul) for winning the campaign. No matter—the defense secretary
trumpeted his kind of victory.
When attention turned to a possible invasion of Iraq, however,
Rumsfeld was dismayed to fi nd that the military expected to reprise its
1991 Gulf War campaign. Franks started with a plan developed by his
CENTCOM predecessor, Marine General Anthony Zinni, that called
for some 350,000 troops. It would take many months to position such
a force, during which time it would be vulnerable to an Iraqi counter-
strike and might stir unrest in the Arab world. In the defense secretary’s
view, this represented the kind of stale thinking he had come to the
Pentagon to sweep aside. He demanded that Franks redo the plan to
take better advantage of the capabilities that had been demonstrated in
Afghanistan, making full use of Special Operations forces and carefully