t he p erils of o ptimism 293with terrorists and reshaping the Iraqi military, which lay beyond the
capacity of his small team. But the president did not make sure other
agencies would fi ll the gaps.
Even more, Bush did not grasp the implications of his vision of
post-Saddam Iraq and the broader region for the American postwar
role. To accomplish such ambitious aims required the most thorough
attention to the diffi culties that can derail the establishment of a liberal,
market-oriented society. It may well be, as Bush often insisted, that
people yearn for liberty. Yet to get there they must still navigate a haz-
ardous road if their point of departure is the Iraq of Saddam Hussein—
fearful, sectarian, divided, impoverished, and, in a word, broken.
What the president envisioned, in short, would require nation
building, contrary to his supposition as a presidential candidate.
Rumsfeld remained wedded to that earlier outlook, and Bush never
instructed him otherwise.
Th e entire prewar planning process, moreover, suff ered from a lack
of presidential leadership. By delegating so much responsibility and not
scrutinizing the decisions made by key subordinates, Bush let slip from
his hands much of the freedom of action that had been bestowed on
him by the post-9/11 combination of circumstances. Important choices,
such as the size of the force to be used in the invasion, would have
far-reaching consequences that could not be reversed. With very
limited “boots on the ground,” American fi eld commanders could not
secure Baghdad, other major Iraqi cities, all the potential WMD sites,
critical facilities such as oil wells and the electrical grid, and Iraq’s long
borders, across which Baathist leaders might fl ee and fi nd safe havens.
CENTCOM and the generals leading the operation would be
compelled to make diffi cult choices, and do so based on poor infor-
mation from within Iraq. Also, because the small force meant much of
Iraq would not see American troops, Rumsfeld’s plan assured that
postwar security would be precarious. Th is would invite Iraqis to settle
old scores and ignite feuds; displaced Baathists and sectarian factions
would fi nd themselves with openings to organize resistance to whatever
political authority eventually emerged in Baghdad.
Consider what might be termed the “Shinseki alternative.” A much
larger initial force could have covered all of the important locations and
closed the borders, and could then have been withdrawn if the security