294 e lusive v ictories
situation did not necessitate an ongoing massive American military
presence. It would certainly cost far less to prevent an insurgency than
to fi ght against one. Although it can never be proven, observers such as
Larry Diamond, who would later serve as a civilian advisor in Iraq,
believe that had the United States invaded with overwhelming strength,
no serious insurgency would have erupted. Nor would it be easy after
American troops seized Baghdad to increase the force level to the
numbers Shinseki had recommended. After all, doing so would mean
the administration had gotten the whole thing wrong, an admission
that might have painful political repercussions.
“Mission Accomplished”
As a military operation, the invasion of Iraq that began on March 18,
2003, succeeded in achieving its immediate objective, ousting Saddam
Hussein from power. Th ings did not go exactly as expected—we will see
that initial Iraqi resistance assumed an irregular form few had antici-
pated—but in warfare they rarely do. In less than a month, American
troops had entered Baghdad, and Saddam and the rest of the regime’s
senior leadership fl ed or went into hiding. American audiences were
treated to television scenes of joyous Iraqis toppling statues and defacing
images of their former ruler. Rumsfeld’s vision of a new U.S. military
that moved light and fast seemed to be vindicated, and the president
basked in the public acclaim that follows a sweeping battlefi eld triumph.
Saddam had agreed to readmit UN weapons inspectors in January
2003, but a profound lack of mutual understanding precluded peaceful
resolution of the crisis. Each side regarded the inspections process pri-
marily as a political gambit aimed at an international audience. By
agreeing to inspections, Saddam hoped split the international com-
munity and turn certain key nations against the United States. He was
never prepared to comply fully and readily with the inspectors’
demands, however, because he still sought to maintain some doubt
about his WMD capability to deter his internal and regional enemies.
To the last minute, he seems to have questioned whether the United
States seriously intended to invade. For his part, Bush was prepared to
avoid a military showdown only if the Iraqis came clean about their
WMD program. Because the administration believed Saddam