t he p erils of o ptimism 295understood that the United States was his most important adversary, he
would see it as in his interest to comply with the weapons inspectors.
His foot-dragging, then, invited but one interpretation. “The only
logical conclusion,” writes Bush, “was that he had something to hide,
something so important that he was willing to go to war for it.” Th e
UN inspectors and the United States established as the standard of
compliance that Iraq would have to prove affi rmatively that it had no
WMD. But the Iraqi leader refused to meet this standard, lest his
weakness be exposed to the foes he actually feared most. On the other
side, the administration could not fi nd the proverbial smoking gun that
might have made it possible to overcome division within the UN
Security Council. Despite Powell’s attempts, it did not approve a reso-
lution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.
Th e American invasion plan ultimately rested on a single main line
of attack from Kuwait to Baghdad. Th roughout the planning process,
the United States had hoped to strike as well from the north, but the
Turkish government held off granting approval. As the Army’s 4th
Infantry Division waited on ships in the Mediterranean, American dip-
lomatic overtures to Ankara were rebuffed. Turkey refused even to
permit American overflights, complicating the air campaign. T h e
entire ground eff ort would be mounted by the equivalent of a single
American corps, under the command of Lieutenant General David
McKiernan. A British division would be committed in the south of
Iraq, to secure Basra and the surrounding area. All told, some 145,000
American and coalition troops would be used in the initial invasion.
CENTCOM commander Franks and McKiernan expected Saddam
Hussein to concentrate his best troops, the Republican Guard, for a
street-by-street defense of Baghdad, where close-quarters combat would
neutralize American technological advantages. Through rapid
movement and effective use of air power, the American command
intended to prevent the Iraqis from regrouping in the capital and to
destroy the Iraqi command and control system so enemy forces would
be reduced to a disorganized, eff ectively headless mass.
Iraqi plans continued to refl ect Saddam’s sensitivity to both external
and internal threats. He wanted to meet a conventional attack much as
the American plan anticipated: by forcing the United States into a
costly fight for Baghdad. He still believed the Americans had no