296 e lusive v ictories
stomach for casualties and would either avoid such a contest or quit
when their losses mounted, letting him remain in power. Further,
urban combat meant high civilian casualties, which would turn inter-
national opinion against the United States. At the same time, fearing a
loss of control within Iraq once loyal troops withdrew to the capital, the
regime decided shortly before the invasion to distribute arms to Baath
Party headquarters across the country. Th ese weapons would in turn be
given to party cadres to repress any insurrections. Although a few
U.S. planners raised the possibility of attacks by Baathist fedayeen irreg-
ulars against the long, exposed lines of communication behind the
troops heading toward Baghdad, senior offi cers and Pentagon planners
paid little attention. In their defense, it is not clear that Saddam Hussein
and his top commanders expected the fedayeen to play a signifi cant
part in the Iraqi defense scheme.
As the invasion commenced, McKiernan’s corps moved northwest
rapidly from Kuwait toward Baghdad, skirting densely settled areas
where possible. Intelligence estimates predicted mass Iraqi military sur-
renders, even defections of entire units, but most Iraqi soldiers simply
threw away their uniforms and blended into the population. Still, at
points the advancing Americans encountered fi erce resistance they had
not anticipated from irregulars dressed in civilian clothes. Too lightly
armed to block the armored thrust, many fedayeen sacrifi ced their lives
in futile attacks. Th e resistance was more deadly to the follow-on trans-
portation units trying to supply the forward combat elements. Despite
this opposition, American commanders succeeded in preventing their
Iraqi counterparts from regrouping major units in Baghdad. U.S.
troops reached the outskirts of the capital within three weeks.
Th e Stalingrad-style battle for Baghdad that Saddam Hussein sought
never came. Upon their arrival in the Baghdad vicinity, American units
captured several strategic locations such as the international airport.
Th ese served as launch points for a few armored thrusts into downtown
Baghdad. Th e U.S. troops encountered determined opposition from
fedayeen, but Iraqi command and control had already evaporated and
the surviving fi ghters soon melted away. Saddam went into hiding,
while other regime leaders sought sanctuary in the Tikrit area, the dicta-
tor’s birthplace and base of political support, or escaped across the unse-
cured Syrian border. With the eff ective end of any coherent defense,