316 e lusive v ictories
chorus of critics who wanted the United States to cut its losses and
seek an exit strategy. For a president under siege, the ISG provided
useful political cover, a withdrawal timetable with bipartisan sanction.
Public opinion strongly favored the withdrawal timetable, too, with 71
percent in favor; only 9 percent responded that victory was still
possible.
Th e president faced a pivotal juncture. Having left too much in the
hands of others for too long, he recognized the imperative to assert
himself. Th e war had run off course, with a military strategy no longer
connected to the national political objectives he had established at the
outset. Determined not to be Lyndon Johnson, he had also not heeded
Eliot Cohen’s advice that he be Abraham Lincoln. In December 2006
and January 2007, with the war in Iraq at a turning point, Bush had his
Lincoln moment. He fi nally claimed ownership of his war.
Rejecting the popular ISG proposal for a withdrawal timetable, Bush
opted instead to augment U.S. troop strength temporarily. He saw dis-
engagement as an admission of defeat that he was not prepared to
make. To those around the president, such as Hadley and Cheney, or to
anyone who had followed Bush’s statements on the war, it was clear that
the president had invested far too much to accept such an outcome.
He reiterated the apocalyptic implications of leaving Iraq to its fate in
his January 7, 2007, speech announcing his choice:
Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new
recruits. Th ey would be in a better position to topple moderate gov-
ernments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund
their ambitions.... Our enemies would have a safe haven from
which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On
September 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the
other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities.
For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq. Withdrawal, then, was out of the question. But so, too, was massive,
sustained escalation. Th e skeptical Democratic congressional majority
would not authorize or fund force expansion on the scale that would be
required. With no other options at hand, Bush seized on the surge
concept. The prospects for success were not promising, either: the