t he p erils of o ptimism 317additional forces would create only a brief window in which to reverse
the trends in Iraq, while COIN doctrine emphasized that the “seize,
hold, and build” formula worked only if given time.
Th e president also put in place a new team to implement the surge
policy. Robert Gates, a well-respected member of the Iraq Study Group
but an agnostic about whether the new approach could work, replaced
Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. On the ground in Iraq, Petraeus
replaced Casey, who would be given the Westmoreland treatment—
kicked upstairs to serve as army chief of staff.
Staying the Course Redux
Having chosen the troop surge option and picked a new commander,
Bush again stepped back and let his subordinates run the Iraq War.
Many critical choices had yet to be made, and presidential delegation
meant they would be left to Petraeus and those around him. For a time
the issue remained in doubt: violence in Iraq continued to increase and
American casualties mounted. However, by fall 2007, insurgent attacks
declined, the result of both new American tactics and other develop-
ments on the ground, notably the polarization between Sunni tribal
leaders and foreign jihadists. Some Democrats tried to impose a dead-
line for American troop withdrawals, but the president and his allies
easily forestalled these attempts. Bush thus staved off both the worst in
Iraq and his opponents at home. Nonetheless, set against his initial war
goals, the results fell far short of expectations. Th e American people
responded in turn by distancing themselves from the war.
As we’ve seen, other presidents have relinquished hands-on direction
of military aff airs in the later stages of a war. Lincoln deferred to Grant
after picking him as the overall Union commanding general in early
1864, going so far as to decline to inquire into the details of the general’s
plans. By that point in the Civil War, though, Grant had a demon-
strated record of battlefi eld success, and he and Lincoln agreed on the
need for a “hard war” against the South. It would be a stretch to claim
that Petraeus had a comparable track record as an eff ective battlefi eld
commander when he ascended to the top slot in Iraq in 2007. His pre-
vious assignment, developing the new COIN doctrine and codifying it
in an offi cial Army manual, had been seen within the service as derailing