318 e lusive v ictories
his rise to the top level of command. Roosevelt also left most opera-
tional decisions to his military commanders in the latter stages of the
Second World War. Not only had they proven their capacity, they had
shown that they understood the president’s grand strategy and how to
connect lesser choices to it. Petraeus, by contrast, would be asked to
implement the still-unproven “seize, hold, and build” operational
approach in Iraq and to gain the cooperation of hostile Iraqi
factions.
Still, Bush bestowed broad operational latitude and freedom from
political oversight on the new American commander. Just where and
how to use the additional troops rested with Petraeus and his subordi-
nates. They decided to disperse U.S. troops in contested areas of
Baghdad, where they would live among the people. Th is tactic sought
to make security visible to strife-torn neighborhoods and gradually
build the residents’ confidence that they would be protected from
attacks by the various Iraqi factions. In time, such confi dence would
translate into better intelligence about insurgent activities, planned
attacks, and membership, though in the short run U.S. troops would
face local hostility and be more vulnerable to attack.
Initial returns were discouraging. As expected, the troops sent to stay
in Baghdad’s most dangerous areas came under frequent attack and
suff ered high casualties. Back home, where ordinary citizens knew little
of the logic behind the tactics, the fi gures—more attacks, more Ameri-
cans dying—suggested that nothing had changed for the better.
Iraqi politics, too, continued to bedevil American eff orts to improve
security. American commanders soon came to understand that Prime
Minister Maliki’s government was widely seen among Sunnis as a pro-
Shiite actor in the sectarian violence rather than as a neutral broker. ^
Th at the Sunni perception had a sound foundation became evident
when Maliki insisted on his right to approve any U.S. operation that
targeted Shiite militias. Sunnis also complained about killings by the
Iraqi army, which had been penetrated by Shiite extremists. In coop-
eration with various American civilian offi cials, including the president,
Petraeus pressured the Iraqi leader to be more even-handed and to
distance himself from his hard-line Shiite backers. But as the Americans
had discovered decades earlier in Saigon, an external power deeply
invested in the success of a client regime exercises little leverage.