t he p erils of o ptimism 319Nevertheless, some developments held promise, and Petraeus moved
quickly to capitalize on these. Among Iraqi Sunnis, a number of tribal
leaders had become disenchanted with al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had
emerged as a powerful and brutal rival to their authority within their
community. Beginning in Anbar Province (hence, termed the “Anbar
Awakening”) as early as September 2006, the increasing friction
between the indigenous leaders and the foreign-led AQI took a violent
turn, adding another layer of complexity to the sectarian strife ripping
apart the country. Some tribal leaders, at great risk to themselves and
their families, decided to seek ties with the U.S. military. Interestingly,
they did so because they believed they had already defeated the Amer-
ican forces, which would soon begin to withdraw. In the time the U.S.
troops remained, they could be useful allies in taking down AQI. Th e
tribal leaders proposed a quid pro quo: arm us and we will help expose
AQI so you can destroy it, while we also protect our communities
against Shia depredations. Over objections from the Iraqi government,
Petraeus agreed to give weapons to the Sunni groups, many of whom
until recently had been fi ghting American troops. Th e move soon
paid dividends in improved intelligence that could be used against AQI
leaders and in lessened violence in Sunni neighborhoods. Th rough
the confl uence of COIN tactics and the shift in Sunni priorities, then,
insurgent attacks began to decline in the latter half of 2007.
Moreover, the Iraqi government started to move at last to curb Shiite
militia power. In southern Iraq, an area of British responsibility, forces
aligned with Moqtada al-Sadr had largely taken over Basra. Sadr himself
maintained close connections with Iran, and American offi cials were
keenly sensitive to the prospect of expanding Iranian infl uence. Prime
Minister Maliki decided unilaterally in early 2008 to mount a military
operation with Iraqi troops against the Sadrist forces to restore gov-
ernment control. To the surprise of many, including U.S. commanders,
Iraqi units demonstrated new eff ectiveness against the militia. Facing
likely defeat, Sadr ordered his forces to stand down, permitting the
reestablishment of government control over Basra. Th e government
fi nally showed it was not entirely the captive of Shiite factions.
Small signs of political progress could also be discerned, though not
in the form the Bush administration had expected when the president
approved the troop surge. Notwithstanding American urging, no