t he p erils of o ptimism 325absent the willingness of Sunni tribal leaders to shift roles from insurgents
to partners with the U.S. troops, the additional fi ve brigades that Petraeus
received could not have turned the tide. Th e insurgents could simply have
bided their time, because the American military was too overextended to
sustain the force level needed for population security. (General Shinseki
turned out to be close to the mark: in the end, when the 160,000 U.S.
troops were added to the Iraqi Army and the legitimized Sunni self-defense
forces, the total number of soldiers and security personnel policing Iraq in
late 2007 exceeded 400,000.) Nor could Bush have anticipated Prime
Minister Maliki’s decision to crack down on the Sadrist militia, though
the president and his diplomats consistently encouraged the Iraqi leader
to do so. Th anks to fortuitous developments, the disaster that seemed to
be unfolding in 2006 was averted. Th e president deserves some credit for
the reversal of fortune, but it does not balance the ledger on his overall
record as a wartime leader.
Iraq reminds us of the limitations of wartime presidential power.
Th is claim seems to fl y in the face of the evidence. Th e Bush adminis-
tration used the 9/11 attacks to justify a dramatic expansion of presi-
dential authority, especially encroachments on civil liberties and on
established protections for captured enemy combatants (recall the
administration’s defense of “waterboarding” and “enhanced interro-
gation techniques”). Yet despite the extraordinary military, intelligence,
and police means at its disposal, despite the loosening of restraints
made possible by 9/11, despite the eff ective exploitation of popular fears
to sweep aside questions, the administration found itself unable to
control the course of events in Iraq. Th e iconic weapon of this war
turned out to be not some high-tech marvel of Rumsfeld’s transformed
military but the lowly IED. Much like his predecessors, Bush saw his
early choices (and those he let others make) cramp his options,
depriving him of the power to change direction. He briefl y held in his
hands complete freedom of action, and then it vanished.