i ntroduction 25of Prohibition and agricultural price supports (prompted by the collapse
of farm prices when wartime demand subsided); and the Second World
War put civil rights back on the agenda, along with national health
insurance.
Within this political environment, a president must address the sixth
key task: to sustain political support for the war eff ort. Th e erosion or
even collapse of popular backing for a war can doom the prospects for
victory and peace-building. Public disillusionment may sap military
morale and almost certainly will encourage an adversary. If the pres-
ident has set ambitious postwar objectives, in the way Wilson did
during World War I, the challenge is more daunting. Th e sacrifi ces
imposed by the war may drain, even exhaust, public support and yield
a strong craving for a return to the routine concerns of peace. Fortu-
nately for a president who must boost public confi dence in the war
eff ort, he does not need to do it entirely on his own. His political allies,
whose fortunes are tied to his and thus to success in the war, can be
counted on to off er steadfast backing, both in the halls of government
and with the public. Even as violence worsened in Iraq prior to the
2006 midterm election, most Republicans in Congress stood behind
President Bush. Yet much will depend upon a president’s ability to
communicate eff ectively with the citizenry and upon the course of war
events, over which he exercises only limited control.
Why Presidents Struggle at War
A wartime president’s vast resources are not enough to overcome all the
leadership challenges he must address. At the outset he can count on
support from Congress, issue orders through the military chain of
command and expect obedience, gain access to the airwaves to state the
case for war, and off er inducements to other nations to join the United
States in a military coalition. Above all, economic and technological
might assure that a powerful military establishment will be at a presi-
dent’s disposal. But, as I’ve suggested, American military capabilities
may not be appropriate for certain wars, especially ones that involve
irregular adversaries who fight on terms that neutralize American
advantages and exploit their own. (Time usually favors the weaker side
in asymmetric confl icts.) Th e resources presidents fi nd most readily