i nheriting a b ad h and 337decision to deploy the additional 30,000 troops to the American people
on December 1, 2009. The president glossed over the diminished
objective. Even as the United States still sought “to disrupt, dismantle,
and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” he said, the new
military strategy aimed to “break the Taliban’s momentum.” Only the
most careful listener would note the distinction, critical though it was.
Dropped as well was all reference to Afghanistan as a “war of necessity,”
a phrase the president had used as recently as the previous September.
He was more forthright about his determination not to redo the Iraq
surge. By insisting on a time frame for the transition to Afghan respon-
sibility, he rejected “a nation-building project of up to a decade” as
something “beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost.” Th e
strongest advocates for that kind of counterinsurgency enterprise were
his own military commanders. Obama went on record as rejecting their
recipe for victory. Whether the public would grant him the time to
pursue a military campaign that could not yield victory remained an
open question.
As with his predecessors, Obama’s decisions about troop increases
and timetables eliminated most of his freedom of action. From that
point forward, absent some dramatic change in the international setting,
he could no longer alter the purpose of the war. He also could not
increase troop levels without provoking a sharp political reaction among
his core supporters and congressional allies. Lost, too, was a measure of
diplomatic leverage over Kabul and Islamabad. Both the Afghan and
Pakistani governments would calculate their best interests based on their
assessment of the consequences of the pending American-NATO troop
departures. Even with a pledge of long-term assistance, any real combat
with insurgents by either government would have to be done by their
own forces. Although Obama retained control over the pace of with-
drawal, moreover, domestic political considerations—such as his
reelection bid—would push him toward an earlier exit.
Playing Out the String
Th e war has proceeded since December 2009 largely as might have been
expected. American, NATO, and Afghan forces have improved security
in the places they hold, but there are far too few troops to pacify most