i nheriting a b ad h and 339service evidently continue to see the Taliban has a useful instrument
for influencing political developments in Afghanistan. A d m i r a l
Mullen, at the end of his tenure as JCS chairman, gave voice to Amer-
ican frustrations when he declared before Congress that Pakistani
intelligence operatives assisted extremist attacks on Kabul, including
the U.S. embassy.
Like his wartime predecessors, Obama has seen his window of agency
close. He began with a narrow scope for action—essentially, he could
choose the speed of an American exit and how best to use U.S. forces
for the remainder of the period when they would be engaged in active
combat. Having made the decisions in late 2009, he has been reduced
largely to the role of a spectator. As the United States draws down its
forces in Afghanistan, Kabul and Islamabad seem less likely to respond
to American appeals. Th e situation recalls Le Duc Th o’s words to Henry
Kissinger: if the United States could not prevail in Vietnam with a half
million troops, why would it expect to have its way with far fewer?
Obama is but the most recent president to discover that victory can be
elusive.