c onclusion 341Revisiting the Puzzles
In the introduction, I framed several puzzles involving wartime presi-
dential leadership. Th e seven presidents I have examined closely suggest
that, in intellectual terms, the puzzles can be explained. But they also
point to momentous political problems for American leaders and cit-
izens. On this level, alas, eff ective solutions may not exist. Th at is deeply
troubling, for at stake is the fate of each wartime presidency and its
broadest consequences.
Th e fi rst puzzle involves the broad latitude a president exercises to
send American armed forces into battle nearly anywhere in the world
with no eff ective political restraint. Presidents have capitalized on their
constitutional powers and military resources to create situations in
which military confl ict is virtually inevitable. As commander in chief of
the armed forces, a president can deploy troops in a way likely to
provoke an attack. Th is may be intentional, as in the case of Abraham
Lincoln in 1861 when he sent reinforcements to Fort Sumter, knowing
this would precipitate a clash with rebels in Charleston Harbor. Or the
provocation may be inadvertent: Franklin Roosevelt meant to deter a
Japanese off ensive in the Pacifi c when he reinforced Hawaii and the
Philippines in 1941. Although Congress may not yet have authorized
the use of force, once American troops are poised on the edge of
combat, the political pressure on the legislative branch to acquiesce in
the exercise of presidential war-making initiative has been too strong to
resist. Lyndon Johnson demonstrated this in 1964 after the Tonkin Gulf
incident, as did George W. Bush in 2002 when he sought approval to
take military action against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Diplomatic
powers vested in the president also give him means to make war more
likely. Roosevelt aligned the United States closely with Great Britain
before the Second World War in ways certain to antagonize Hitler. On
balance, the power to go to war has come to rest entirely in the hands
of the president, hardly the situation envisioned by the Framers of the
Constitution.
No eff ective check on presidential power to engage the nation in
military conflict seems in the offing. From time to time, Congress
bestirs itself and makes gestures to rein in presidential discretion over
the use of force. But these have proven ineff ective because they do not