342 e lusive v ictories
touch the core power of the president as commander in chief to position
American forces. In the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the War
Powers Resolution, but the increased frequency of signifi cant military
operations in the past two decades demonstrates the ineff ectiveness of
the measure. Presidents have never acknowledged its constitutionality,
instead preferring the prudent course of securing congressional approval
in advance of most military interventions. Even when they do not,
however, Congress has been unable or unwilling to act. To take a recent
example, Barack Obama in March 2011 ordered American forces to par-
ticipate in a multinational campaign to protect Libyan rebels against
attacks by the Libyan regime. He did so without seeking congressional
approval, and his action drew only feeble legislative protest.
Th e second puzzle is why presidents, in their role as military com-
mander in chief, still struggle to fi nd an eff ective approach to achieve
the national objectives they have established in going to war. Th e his-
torical record makes clear that there is no one right way to direct the
military during wartime. I identified two contending schools of
thought: one (objective control) that argues political leaders ought to
leave military operations in the hands of the military; another (active
direction) that counters that because war seeks political goals, no neat
line can be drawn between political matters and military ones. Presi-
dents have achieved some of their political goals using either approach.
Lincoln and Roosevelt came closest to meeting their objectives, securing
clear military success and fulfi lling some of their core national political
objectives. Both combined hands-on control with periods during which
they left the fi ghting to their uniformed commanders. Interestingly, the
two presidents followed a similar pattern: an initial phase of very active
direction, followed later in the war by more detached guidance when
they were confi dent that their military leaders had developed and would
pursue eff ective strategies. Wilson, though, accomplished exactly what
he sought—a demonstration of the indispensability of American mil-
itary intervention to give him a strong hand at the peace table—despite
giving Pershing virtually no direction in how best to use the American
Expeditionary Force in France.
Wartime presidents have also tried diff erent methods of overseeing
military operations. Notwithstanding his fi xation on certain battles (for
example, Khe Sanh), Johnson never exercised a fi rm grip over ground