c onclusion 347terms. For Lincoln, peace-building meant measures to lift the freedmen
from their position of racial subordination; for Wilson, a generous
peace for Germany, an international organization to prevent future cat-
astrophic confl ict, and self-determination for the former subjects of
collapsed empires; for Roosevelt, a stable international order policed by
great powers and an end to colonialism; for Bush, a democratic Iraq
that would trigger a broad movement for political liberalization across
the Middle East and the Islamic world. By contrast, Johnson, Nixon,
and Obama have pursued relatively limited objectives: the fi rst two
sought an independent South Vietnam that could determine its own
political future; the last has tried to reduce the violence in Afghanistan
to a level that will not undermine the Kabul government and to neu-
tralize the threat of future terror attacks.
Although a president might claim victory even without accom-
plishing his full set of peace-building objectives, some triumphs would
be barren without them, and certainly Americans would doubt the cost
to be justifi ed by lesser returns. Consider Wilson: precisely because
going to war for the principle of freedom of navigation in wartime
meant so little to him or his domestic public, battlefi eld success would
be hollow without a durable peace. Despite the stakes, though, all
wartime presidents, including Lincoln, have devoted too little attention
to realizing their vision for a postwar order, and they waited too long to
prepare for the world they intended to fashion after the fi ghting ended.
Disappointing peace-building eff orts result from a number of ele-
ments. Some scholars stress the check imposed by the changing inter-
national environment, and my analysis supports their fi nding. O n c e
the glue of wartime necessity no longer binds allies, a president will fi nd
himself with reduced leverage to advance his agenda. Wilson missed his
chance to persuade Entente leaders to sign on to his design for col-
lective security through an international organization by waiting for the
armistice to secure their approval. Roosevelt, learning from his prede-
cessor’s failure, pushed ahead with the formation of the United Nations
before the Second World War ended and the diff erences between the
Western powers and the Soviet Union hardened. Even so, he exercised
limited control over international developments and was powerless to
draw the Soviet Union into a liberal international order or shape the
political future in either China or Indochina.