i ntroduction 27latitude in determining whether to go to war, presidents have been
extremely eff ective in exploiting circumstances to make armed confl ict
seem inevitable. Th ey have also used their symbolic position as head of
state to generate initial public and congressional backing for their
decision to go to war. Put another way, no president who has con-
cluded that military action is necessary has been checked by Congress,
the public, or other nations. Presidents have also succeeded in laying
the diplomatic foundation for most wars, though in 2002–2003 the
Bush administration stumbled in its attempts to forge a broad coalition
in favor of military action in Iraq (the so-called Coalition of the
Willing). In military terms, recent presidents have faced every national
security crisis confi dent (sometimes overly so) that the military might
at their fi ngertips would be equal to or greater than that of any poten-
tial foe.
Once they have settled upon the necessity of military action, most
presidents have met the third challenge: they have identifi ed national
objectives clearly, including the articulation of ambitious peace-building
goals that go beyond victory in the narrow sense. Since Wilson, wartime
presidents rarely confi ne themselves to defeating the adversary. Th ey
envision military action as a vehicle to establish a more stable and har-
monious international order, conducive to American security, economic
interests, and values. On the other hand, presidents fi nd it more dif-
fi cult when circumstances force them to adjust their objectives as a war
progresses. A president may have promised too much, misread the will
or nature of his adversaries, or underestimated the cost of his goals.
In reconciling national goals and military strategy, the fourth chal-
lenge, presidents have compiled a mixed record. I will argue that the
debate between advocates of hands-on political leadership and those
who think that fi ghting a war should be left to military professionals
largely misses the point. Both approaches can claim success—and both
should own up to failures. A president who deploys the wrong kind of
force or misunderstands the relationship between those means and the
political goals he has identifi ed (Johnson in Vietnam, as I explain in
Chapter 4 ) will fail, whether he directs the troops closely or leaves mil-
itary matters to his uniformed commanders. Lost in the argument is a
larger point: presidents accomplish narrow politico-military objectives
more eff ectively than peace-building, resulting in barren triumphs.