354 e lusive v ictories
indefinitely. Other powers will eventually emerge—China, for
example—to alter the international system in ways that deny the
United States the kind of free hand it has claimed since the collapse of
the Soviet Union. In addition, the extraordinary cost of American
defense outlays cannot be sustained. Budget pressures will compel
reductions in defense spending, which in time will limit the freedom of
presidents to fl ex their military muscles as they see fi t.
Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, American presidents will
continue to lead the nation into military conflicts. The hegemonic
position the United States enjoys encourages American leaders to
assume responsibility for sustaining the international order and
responding to threats against it. Of course, presidents have some lat-
itude in deciding which dangers require a military answer. But it seems
inevitable that the actions of some rogue state or an insurgency in some
strategically vital region will provoke military intervention. So long as
the Oval Offi ce sees itself engaged in an open-ended and loosely defi ned
global war on terror, moreover, military force may be used against
shadowy extremist organizations and their protectors or in so-called
failed states where a power vacuum invites such groups to set up branch
operations.
Domestic political factors will also contribute to the proclivity to
wage war. Although the costly and disappointing expeditions in Iraq
and Afghanistan may cool the enthusiasm for martial adventures in the
short run, the post-Vietnam experience suggests that this popular reluc-
tance will be short-lived. Republicans, partial to American unilater-
alism and muscle-fl exing, will identify enemies who understand only
force; Democrats, fearful of seeming too soft, will look for the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate their toughness. Either camp may heed the
clarion call to intervene in the name of human rights. And American
leaders will continue to fi nd that their constituents can be easily fright-
ened, whether by a successful terror attack on the homeland or by
distant threats.
Th e wars to come will most likely take the form of “war amongst the
people,” as have most recent confl icts. With the United States enjoying
commanding technological advantages, no adversary can meet
American armed forces on even terms. Rather, an enemy will seek to
draw U.S. troops into a protracted struggle, with the support of the