c onclusion 355populace the ultimate prize. Unlike the Vietnam aftermath, when the
military turned its back on low-intensity confl icts and counterinsur-
gency, today COIN methods have thoughtful and dedicated propo-
nents within the armed services. Whether counterinsurgency can
produce the political goals presidents establish in going to war remains
unproven. But the COIN approach does seem to add a politico-military
tool to the repertoire of military instruments available to a commander
in chief, and thus may encourage presidents to embark upon the kinds
of confl ict for which other weapons are unsuited.
On the other hand, if military intervention leads the United States
into another protracted conflict, the president will again face the
problem of domestic support. The American people can be readily
primed to back a war at the start; getting them to stay with it is another
matter. Presidents have generated public approval for military action by
using their bully pulpit. Th ey can appeal to both fear and the nation’s
instinct to improve the world, particularly in its own image. Over time,
though, popular backing gives way to indiff erence or, worse, disillu-
sionment and apathy. George W. Bush and senior administration offi -
cials believed that the 9/11 terror attacks inaugurated a “long war”
against Islamic extremism—a struggle they concluded might continue
for a generation. Nothing indicates, though, that the American people
are prepared to fi ght long wars within this “long war.” Put another way,
the United States has adopted global policing responsibilities, of the
sort associated in the past with great imperial powers, yet the American
people have not adopted the imperial mind-set that translates into
support for the extended confl icts that such an international posture
presupposes.
Th e cases I have examined point to certain recommendations that a
president might consider when weighing the prospect of war. First and
foremost, there is the obvious: exhaust every alternative to military
intervention. Wars are instruments of national policy with political
objectives, and some of those goals can be achieved by other means
ranging from diplomacy to economic sanctions. Although the gains
may be incomplete and a threat to peace and stability remains, the
cost—human, economic, and political—will likely be far less than war.
It would help if the United States could call upon more eff ective non-
military tools to infl uence foreign policy outcomes; as it stands, the