28 e lusive v ictories
Other scholars have sought to explain the disappointing record of pres-
idents in achieving their broader goals. In his recent book on the
outcomes of America’s wars, Gideon Rose emphasizes how presidents
and their advisors have been constrained by the international envi-
ronment and by the lessons they glean from previous wars. I will focus
instead on the impact of time: absent swift victory, a president loses
strategic flexibility. Operating within an ever-diminishing space in
which choice is possible, he struggles to remain the master of his cir-
cumstances. Ambitious postwar goals that depend on continued presi-
dential fl exibility, discretion, and broad authority up to and beyond the
cessation of hostilities remain unfulfi lled.
Presidents have fared better in mastering the diplomatic challenge, at
least until the shooting stops. In the period before the United States
emerged as the dominant global power, presidents worried that other
nations might interfere in American confl icts and discouraged third-
party intervention. Since the First World War, the United States has
fought most often as part of an alliance or coalition and usually has led
these multinational eff orts. Concessions have always been part of the
price paid to partner nations for their cooperation. Presidents have
managed the business of alliance/coalition politics eff ectively, retaining
control over the defi nition of war aims and broad military strategy.
Problems may surface if a war stalls short of victory, however, as coa-
lition partners, sensitive to their own domestic political pressures, with-
draw. Th e modest coalition that supported the invasion of Iraq became
smaller during the subsequent insurgency as participants recoiled from
the cost, which included terrorist attacks within their own cities. Even
successful military alliances can yield diplomatic complications. Once
peace is imminent or the enemy lays down his arms, the glue of
necessity ceases to bind the United States to its partners; they instead
pursue their respective national interests. At the end of the Second
World War, Stalin’s determination to establish a Soviet sphere of
infl uence in Eastern Europe precipitated decades of Cold War. Back
home, too, presidents discover that enthusiasm for ongoing interna-
tional engagement has declined, so they have fewer resources with
which to entice erstwhile fellow combatant nations to continue to par-
ticipate in collective security projects. Again, the impact is most evident
on a president’s capacity to attain his vision of a new postwar order.