34 e lusive v ictories
Th e decision to embark on war—or pursue a path that will inevi-
tably lead to armed confl ict—is one of the weightiest ones any national
leader faces, so it is fair to ask whether Lincoln might have avoided
recourse to arms in early 1861. Our assessment today, of course, is
colored by our knowledge of the consequences of his actions—a violent
struggle that cost more lives than any other war in American history yet
resulted in the end of slavery and the restoration of a single, united
nation.
Th at the price would be so high and the eff ects so far-reaching were
not even dimly suspected by Lincoln or perhaps anyone else at the time.
Instead he had to weigh the likely eff ects of the two primary courses of
action available to him, neither promising. On one side, he could
choose to let secession stand. To do so would spell political disaster for
the young and fragile Republican Party that he led by virtue of his
position. More than that, one act of secession would likely precipitate
others, resulting in the complete dismembering of the United States
and the end of the great experiment in republican government on a
continental scale. In his inaugural speech, Lincoln warned that the
logic of secession knew no end point, that the southern states would
disagree among themselves and fragment yet again. But his words
applied with equal force to the North, where different regions had
distinct economic interests that could easily drive them apart. In short,
the conditions necessary to avoid bloodshed would spell the end of the
Union. Lincoln concluded within weeks of his election that he could
not countenance disunion without violating his fundamental responsi-
bility to uphold the Constitution and preserve the nation. ^
On the other side, the new president could act to retain federal
installations in the South, Fort Sumter in particular, and to restore the
authority of the national government. This choice, too, was unat-
tractive, so much so that at fi rst it was opposed by most members of the
cabinet. To insist upon holding Sumter would almost surely bring on a
violent confrontation. And the balance of forces was less favorable than
might appear at fi rst glance. States in the upper South had threatened
to resist federal authority, too, if Washington sought to “coerce” their
rebellious brethren back into the Union. Further, the military resources
available to Lincoln were meager: the U.S. Army consisted of 16,000
troops, most scattered in distant posts across the Far West, and many