38 e lusive v ictories
Th ese concerns soon found voice among northern politicians and the
press.
Th ird, the human cost of the war hardened northern attitudes toward
the enemy. By summer 1862, the toll in casualties had reached horrifi c
proportions, far beyond what anyone could have imagined in the fi rst
days of the confl ict when new recruits marched off to the sounds of
bands and patriotic speeches. Th e two-day battle at Shiloh in April 1862
resulted in more casualties than had been incurred in all previous wars
fought by the United States combined. And that was just the beginning,
as later contests, such as the Seven Days and Second Bull Run
(Manassas), added to the ever-longer list of dead and wounded. Th e
carnage culminated at Antietam on September 17, 1862, where the
23,000 casualties made it the bloodiest one-day battle in American
history. Because regiments were recruited from a single location, more-
over, one severe fi ght could devastate a community. To this could be
added the mounting death toll from illness, a bigger killer in the Civil
War than combat, plus the ever-increasing cost of raising and main-
taining vast armies. It is not surprising, then, that as the price of
defeating the South rose, more and more northerners concluded that a
“soft peace,” one that left the social order of the rebel states intact,
would be unacceptable.
Lincoln grasped the shifting mood in mid-1862 and began to con-
sider widening the Union objective to encompass the destruction of
slavery. He fi rst broached the idea with members of his inner political
circle early in the summer.
Emancipation posed both benefi ts and risks. On the positive side,
expanding the confl ict to include freedom for those held in bondage
would elevate the moral appeal of the struggle at home and abroad,
while in practical terms it would encourage slaves to fl ee their owners
and seriously disrupt the southern economy, potentially diverting
manpower from Confederate armies. But Lincoln also appreciated the
dangers, political and military. Northern Democrats in large numbers
might turn against the war, complicating all aspects of the Union war
eff ort. For the South, the threat of emancipation would raise the
stakes in the contest, encouraging the rebels to fi ght harder because
the consequences of defeat would be so much more sweeping. Th ere
was also the matter of timing to consider. In the summer of 1862,