l incoln’s s hadow 43
known)—and the offi cers who would lead the Union Army now had
been mere captains or lieutenants then. In the intervening years, some
had gained experience in small-scale actions against Indian tribes in the
West, but this told little about whether they could manage armies of
100,000 men or more. Second, some Republicans mistrusted the
regular army offi cer corps, especially those members who had trained at
West Point, seeing that institution as infected by pro-southern sympa-
thies and pro-Democratic leanings. They wondered whether com-
manders with close friends among their Confederate counterparts
would be prepared to press the fi ght against the enemy, especially if and
when the war turned into a contest to destroy slavery. Although the
Republicans’ concern about the partisan tilt of the offi cer corps was
misplaced (because more were appointed to West Point by Whigs and
Republicans than by Democrats), they made their view known to the
president. Th ird, political considerations weighed heavily on command
choices, pulling Lincoln in diff erent directions.
Th e infl uence of politics merits elaboration. As James McPherson
points out, Lincoln understood that it was essential to preserve broad
support for the war eff ort among diff erent political factions, geo-
graphic regions, and key ethnic constituencies, such as Irish and
German immigrants. Commissions for generals with clear political
appeal or support contributed to sustaining the popular perception
of a national war and helped raise troops among their constitu-
encies. Within the memory of Lincoln and his peers was the con-
trary example provided by James K. Polk during the war with
Mexico: Polk had used general officer commissions as a form of
patronage for his own Democratic Party, and Whigs had resented his
partisan handling of the confl ict. Nonetheless, these political gen-
erals had a keen appreciation of the political dimensions of the war,
including the impact of the electoral clock on the timing of military
operations.
Politics also led the president to share the task of selecting generals.
Although the initiative for appointing generals rested with the president
by custom and statute, Lincoln did not exercise this power unilaterally,
particularly at the start of the war. Rather, to enhance his power within
his own party coalition, he deemed it prudent to permit congressional
Republicans to choose some generals. In this manner, for example, Elihu