l incoln’s s hadow 47
Framed to achieve the initial goal of restoring the Union, Anaconda
did not envision a war that would seek to destroy the foundations of
the South’s slave-based political economy. Scott, a native Virginian, was
appalled at that prospect. Still, the strategy could be adapted for another
kind of war, one aimed at the thorough destruction of the slave
economy and requiring much greater suff ering in the rebel states to
secure their acquiescence. In broad terms, this is just how Lincoln chose
to proceed: he sought to isolate the South and divide it at the Missis-
sippi, and then to drive the Union armies into the Confederacy in
simultaneous advances that would capitalize on the North’s numerical
advantages to overwhelm the rebel forces. Putting this strategy into
practice, though, proved daunting, and the eff ort severely tested the
patience of the president and the resolve of the northern people before
victory was achieved.
Geography shaped the war, dividing it into multiple theaters at the
operational level (see map 1.1). One set of campaigns would be waged
along the southern coasts, with a naval blockade and a series of small-
scale amphibious operations. Although some ports (such as Wilmington,
North Carolina) proved stubborn obstacles, this part of the war played
to the Union advantages because the sheer length of seacoast meant it
must be thinly garrisoned, assuring that the North’s military could
concentrate superior forces at any point it chose. On land, the terrain
divided along the Appalachian spine: to the east, the war would be
fought on the limited ground in Virginia; in the much vaster spaces to
the west, campaigns ranged from eastern Tennessee to the Mississippi
and beyond. Th e trans-Mississippi remained peripheral to the outcome
of the war—neither side could win decisively in that sparsely settled
region, although that did not prevent signifi cant bloodshed and an ugly
guerilla confl ict in Missouri. On the other hand, the Mississippi River
mattered greatly to the North, especially for the unimpeded shipment
of goods from the Northwest. Yet opening the great river would not
doom the rebellion—witness the continuation of the war for nearly two
years after the surrender of Vicksburg. Rather, Tennessee and states to its
south and southeast (Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia) held the key,
for Union campaigns through this region would expose the Carolinas to
attack, deprive the Confederate government of vital resources, and
make plain that it could not protect most of its citizens.