l incoln’s s hadow 49
But politics imposed a second geographic logic on the war and on
Lincoln’s strategy. With Washington and Richmond, the Confederate
capital, separated by a mere one hundred miles, most attention would
focus on Virginia, especially the northeastern part of the state. Union
victory here might not end the rebellion, since the Confederacy could
opt for a defense in depth and force northern armies into long
campaigns with severe logistical demands. But the North could lose
the war in the eastern theater. Virginia was close to vital population
centers such as Baltimore and Philadelphia, which might be endan-
gered by southern raids or invasions. And the concentration of the
press and politicians on what happened in Virginia meant that the
outcome of battles fought there would reverberate across the North.
Above all, Washington, D.C., itself lay adjacent to Virginia, and the
loss of the national capital would be a humiliation that might spell the
end of the Lincoln administration and its war. Confederate leaders
fully appreciated Lincoln’s sensitivity to the vulnerability of the city
and preyed upon it repeatedly (in General Stonewall Jackson’s Shenan-
doah Valley campaign in spring 1862, Robert E. Lee’s advances into
Maryland later that year and into Pennsylvania in summer 1863, and
fi nally Jubal Early’s march to the very outskirts of the capital in summer
1864). To be fair, Confederate leaders were also guilty of a parochial
fixation on Virginia and the East. Thus General Lee successfully
resisted calls that he dispatch troops to Tennessee and Mississippi
during the pivotal Vicksburg campaign or that later he himself assume
command in the West.
Refl ecting the spatial and political geography of the confl ict, Lincoln
pursued Union military strategy through two primary military forces,
each with its own characteristics, capabilities, and tasks. In the East, the
Virginia campaign was led by the Army of the Potomac, seconded by
various smaller forces tasked with protecting Washington. Th e Army of
the Potomac vexed Lincoln like no other. Organized by McClellan and
commanded mostly by offi cers he installed, it refl ected his personal
qualities—though well-trained and disciplined, it was accustomed to
elaborate logistical support, deliberate in its movements, and suff used
with a peculiar inferiority complex. When up against Lee’s Army of
Northern Virginia, the offi cers and soldiers in the Army of the Potomac
seemed fatalistic, as though they knew they would be out-generaled.