l incoln’s s hadow 61
that kept him in step with the public mood. He also had at his disposal
an elaborate party organization and partisan press to help him shape
public opinion and intimidate opponents. It helped, too, that the
Republican Party could deliver non-military benefi ts to key constitu-
encies. In this respect, Lincoln stands apart from other wartime presi-
dents, whose domestic agendas have been derailed by their military
commitments.
Several factors severely tested Lincoln’s ability to maintain support
for the war. First and foremost was the sheer cost of the confl ict in
human and fi nancial terms, beyond anything Americans had experi-
enced, almost beyond comprehension. Sustaining support was a
daunting challenge in the face of heavy losses and battlefi eld setbacks.
Morale slumped in the wake of defeats, as in the late summer of 1862,
after the Second Battle of Bull Run, or the perception that even stag-
gering casualties yielded no real gain, as happened two years later. Had
voters gone to the polls in August 1864, Lincoln and everyone else was
convinced he and his party would have suff ered a crushing defeat.
Second, due to the frequency of elections, including important spring
contests, electoral considerations could never be put off ; the adminis-
tration had no grace period in which bad news might be absorbed by
the public before people voted again. Even elections for state offi ces
were perceived by all as referendums on the war. Th ird, disagreement
over war aims persisted in the North throughout the war. Opposition
to the war rose from late 1862 (following the announcement of emanci-
pation) through the 1864 elections, sometimes finding violent
expression, as in the July 1863 New York City anti-draft riots that
“degenerated into a virtual racial pogrom.” Last, antiwar sentiment
claimed an organizational home in the Democratic Party, particularly
after publication of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in
September 1862. Although Jeff erson Davis faced signifi cant discontent
as Confederate president, it never coalesced into a political organization
that could compete for power at the polls. Th e Democratic Party in
the North, by contrast, became the center of opposition, even resis-
tance, to the war, its papers virulent in their condemnation of emanci-
pation and eager to feed defeatism for partisan electoral advantage.
While Lincoln wrestled with how to maintain popular backing for
the war, he also faced challenges from within his own political party.