l incoln’s s hadow 63
the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish from the
earth.” But he could also write plainly, in homespun language that
would resonate with any American who had been raised on a farm and
had sent a son or husband off to the war. Lincoln demonstrated a
special genius for the use of metaphors to express complex ideas or
abstract principles in everyday terms.
Consider as an example how he justifi ed his emergency executive
actions, including issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, on the
grounds of absolute necessity. Although as a general principle a pres-
ident must fulfi ll his oath to uphold the Constitution, Lincoln said, he
would violate the essence of that oath were he to act in a way that
sacrifi ced the nation for the sake of literal fi delity to the Constitution.
And then the telling metaphor: “often a limb must be amputated to
save a life, but a life is never wisely given to save a limb.” T o a n
audience that by 1864 had become very familiar with the sight of men
returning from battle missing an arm or a leg, Lincoln’s words struck a
responsive chord.
Th e president put his political and rhetorical skills to good use when
he decided to embrace emancipation in 1862. To make such a move
without laying the groundwork in the court of public opinion would
have been dangerous. Emancipation could not be seen as a response to
abolitionist pressures lest Republican conservatives and War Demo-
crats turn against the administration. Lincoln chose a clever path—he
set the stage for emancipation in a letter that seemed to repudiate abo-
litionist demands. Emancipation, he said, had to be subordinated to
the proper objective of the war, to restore the Union. Were it possible
to win the war without freeing any slaves, he would do so; if victory
required freeing all of them, he would pursue that course; and if it
meant freeing some while leaving others in bondage, he would choose
such a policy. Necessity, not ideology, would govern his actions, a
stance that commanded far wider support than abolitionism even in
the second year of the war. By distancing himself from the radicals’
cause, Lincoln gave himself the political space he needed to endorse
their fundamental goal.
As he sought to sustain popular support for the war, Lincoln could
call upon one critical political asset, his party organization. Th e party
apparatus functioned fi rst as a means by which the president and other