l incoln’s s hadow 81
appropriate and can be achieved, how much progress has been made,
and more.
If Lincoln’s overall performance merits high praise, he still falls short
on certain dimensions of wartime leadership. He did too little and
waited too long to lay a foundation for Reconstruction. In contrast to
politicians who fear and defer to public opinion, Lincoln at times chose
to defend unpopular actions, and he demonstrated some capacity to
persuade doubters that he was correct. (Absent reliable data of the sort
that we now get from opinion polls, such judgments must remain pro-
visional. But historical accounts credit Lincoln’s letters with great
impact.) On the matter of race, though, he shied away from eff orts to
infl uence white Americans, even at the peak of his popularity. To the
very end of the war, he approached Reconstruction entirely as a tool for
dividing southern whites to expedite the defeat of the Confederacy. His
narrow approach suggests that a preoccupation with military victory
will lead any president to devote too little attention to postwar planning.
If that is a consequence of taking direct charge of all things military,
then we may have additional grounds for reconsidering the ideal of the
hands-on supreme commander. Lincoln’s failure to plan for peace,
moreover, raises the troubling possibility that wartime political lead-
ership, with its multiple, demanding challenges, exceeds the capacity of
any person.
We also need to interrogate other aspects of Lincoln’s legacy, all the
more so since, as we shall see, later wartime leaders have drawn heavily
on his example. Presidents during wars always believe they are pursuing
the national interest. From their perspective, opposition to their war
policy is problematic, for critics appear to stand against the nation
itself. Yet in a healthy democratic society, people should ask sharp ques-
tions about the grave matters of war and peace. Such challenges remain
a vital part of presidential accountability, especially if other political
institutions fail to assert themselves. Lincoln was a better leader because
his critics forced him to explain his policies to the American people.
Expansive claims to emergency powers represent Lincoln’s most
dubious contribution to wartime presidential leadership. Once we
accept his premise that the Union had to be preserved, we cannot doubt
that immediate action was needed to respond to secession and prevent
other Border States from leaving the Union. He off ered a persuasive