The Economist - USA (2020-05-16)

The EconomistMay 16th 2020 Middle East & Africa 39

2 owncliqueandimprovethe prospects of
their 19-year-old son, Hafez. In his most re-
cent post Mr Makhlouf (pictured) seemed
to blame her for his misfortune.
But the biggest reason for Mr Makh-
louf’s fall is the president’s need for money
after nine years of civil war that have devas-
tated the economy. In December the gov-
ernment began seizing the businessman’s
assets, citing “customs violations”. The
shakedown came to a head last month
when goons raided Syriatel, the country’s
biggest mobile-network provider, owned
by Mr Makhlouf. Senior managers were ar-
rested and the state demanded at least
$170m in licence fees. It was all part of an
anti-corruption drive, said Mr Assad.
Normally the regime puts guns in the
mouths of troublemakers and calls it sui-
cide. But Mr Makhlouf poses an unusual
challenge. His clan is larger than Mr As-
sad’s and is part of the powerful Haddadin
tribe. Mr Makhlouf has courted their loyal-
ty throughout the war. In 2012 he formed
the Bustan Association, a charity with an
armed wing, to protect and care for his
kinsmen. It provided meals, health care
and jobs—until Mr Assad curbed some of
its activities last year.
Alawite hardliners bewail the downfall
of Mr Makhlouf, whom they consider their
protector. Some suggest the president is
forsaking his own sect for the predomi-
nantly Sunni merchants who are close to
his wife (also a Sunni). Most Alawites have
lost loved ones fighting for Mr Assad, so
they cringe at the thought of him handing
the war’s spoils to Sunnis, many of whom
rebelled against him. “Alawites feel threat-
ened and will rally around Rami,” says a
business associate of Mr Makhlouf. “If [the
security forces] go after him, they risk de-
stabilising the regime.”
Iran, which backs the regime, is looking

on anxiously. Mr Makhlouf has “always

been close to the Iranians”, says the asso-

ciate. “He put all his eggs in the Iranian bas-

ket.” But Iran itself has bigger problems.

The assassination in January of Qassem Su-

leimani, the commander of its foreign op-

erations, and mounting financial trouble

have made it harder for Iran to maintain its

position in Syria. Israel has been increas-

ing its air strikes on Iranian bases in the

country and says Iran is retreating.

Russia, which also backs Mr Assad, may

not mind seeing Iran go. It wants its own

companies to benefit from reconstruction

contracts in Syria. The s-300 air-defence

system that it gave the regime never seems

to work against Israeli missiles. Analysts

say Russia is acquiescing in, if not facilitat-

ing, the strikes on Iranian positions. It has

also moved its forces into areas prized by

Iran and cut it out of negotiations over

northern Syria, where rebels backed by

Turkey continue to hold territory and the

Kurds have carved out a proto-state.

With the regime in disarray some think

Mr Assad might be more willing to negoti-

ate a political solution with the rebels. Rus-

sia wants a settlement in order to convince

Western powers to help fund reconstruc-

tion. Under one (optimistic) scenario, Mr

Assad would accept a new constitution that

devolves powers to a more conciliatory

prime minister ahead of presidential elec-

tions next year.

Good luck with that. Mr Assad appears

as stubborn as ever. Russian diplomats

paint him as a disobedient client. Criticism

of him is increasing in Russian media.

Some reports even suggest that President

Vladimir Putin would prefer to deal with

someone else. But no alternative has

emerged. No matter how much Mr Assad

alienates his allies—and his own people—

they appear stuck with him. 7

Unfriended by Bashar

I

n a worldflipped on its head, a note

of constancy: the Middle East is

arguing about Israel. “Exit 7”, a popular

series aired on Saudi television this

Ramadan, portrays a family led by

Nasser al-Gassabi, a Saudi actor. One

episode has his son Ziad befriend an

Israeli, via an online video game. True

to life, the friendship is cause for con-

troversy. But not everyone is perturbed.

Mr Gassabi’s on-screen father-in-law

describes Israel as a reality and the

Palestinians as ungrateful “enemies”.

Autocrats in the Middle East use

television to push politics—especially

during Ramadan, when big-budget

series attract hours of post-prandial

viewing. In Egypt scripts are vetted for

patriotic themes. Turkey and the uae,

regional rivals, recently made duelling

shows about the Ottoman empire:

benevolent overlords in the former;

unwanted occupiers in the latter. Crit-

ics say “Exit 7” and another Saudi show,

“Um Haroun”, which features Jewish

characters, are attempts to promote

normalisation with Israel.

But much of “Exit 7” deals with

changing mores in Saudi Arabia. It

begins with Mr Gassabi donning a bisht,

a ceremonial cloak, before going to

receive a promotion. “This is the cloak

of responsibility,” he gloats. The twist:

not only is he passed over for the job,

but his new boss is a woman. Another

show, “Ureem”, focuses on a layabout

forced to work as a taxi driver, the sort

of job once reserved for migrants.

The shows, though, dance around

the kingdom’s current anxieties. On

May 11th the state announced austerity

measures to blunt the budgetary

shocks of a pandemic and low oil

prices. It tripled the value-added tax.

Civil servants lost a 1,000-rial ($266)

monthly stipend. Unsurprisingly, the

decree was not prime-time television:

it came just after dawn.

Muhammad bin Salman, the crown

prince, wagers that he can fashion a

new society from the top down. Many

of his changes, from letting women

drive to permitting concerts, were long

sought by Saudis. Looming economic

changes will be more jarring. Gener-

ations of Saudis were insulated from

market-based wages and competitive

pressures. Some will face lower living

standards. A whimsical tvshow will

not assuage them.

Series of changes

Saudi television

BEIRUT

A new vision of society, minus the anxiety