How the Good War Went BadMarch/April 2020 87
the Taliban oensive that year, it is hard to see how any strategy
could have resulted in victory for the United States and the Afghan
government. Nevertheless, a few points stand out when Washington
might have cleared a way to a less bad outcome.
The surge was one o them. In retrospect, the United States would
have been better o i it had never surged at all. I his campaign
promises obligated some number o reinforcements, Obama still
might have deployed fewer troops
than he did—perhaps just the initial
tranche o 21,000. But General Stan-
ley McChrystal, the top U.S. com-
mander in Afghanistan, and General
David Petraeus, the commander o U.S.
Central Command, did not present the president with that kind o
option: all their proposals involved further increases in the number o
U.S. military personnel deployed to Afghanistan. Both generals be-
lieved that escalation was warranted owing to the threat posed by the
possible reestablishment o Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists.
Both had witnessed how a counterinsurgency strategy and unswerv-
ing resolve had turned things around in Iraq, and both thought the
same could be done in Afghanistan. Their case that something had to
be done and their overcon¥dence in counterinsurgency crowded out
the practical alternative o¤ forgoing further reinforcements. Had
Obama done less, U.S. casualties and expenses would likely have been
far lower and still the conditions would have changed little.
It is worth noting that the much-criticized 18-month deadline
that Obama attached to the surge, although unnecessary, was not it-
sel a major missed opportunity. There is scant evidence to support
the charge that i Obama had given no timeline, the Taliban would
have been more exhausted by the surge and would have given up or
negotiated a settlement.
But Obama did err when it came to placing restrictions on U.S.
forces. Prior to 2014, U.S. airstrikes had been used when necessary to
strike enemy targets, and commanders took steps to avoid civilian
casualties. That year, however, as part o the drawdown process, it was
decided that U.S. airstrikes in support o the Afghan army and police
would be employed only “in extremis”—when a strategic location or
major Afghan formation was in danger o imminent annihilation. The
idea was to disentangle U.S. forces from combat and, to a lesser extent,
The intention to get out of
Afghanistan met reality
and blinked.