Foreign Affairs. January-February 2020

Paths to Power

January/February 2020 175

clarity but overlook hybrid regimes in

which the playing field is slanted toward

incumbents even if the outcome of any

particular election is not predetermined.

Also, because the book’s database ends in

2010, just as democratic erosion began to

quicken, the authors aren’t able to shed

much light on one of the most urgent

phenomena in contemporary politics—the

creeping authoritarianism that follows

democratic decay.

Today, in established democracies

across the world, the slow but steady

undermining of norms and institutions

poses a greater threat than sudden coups.

After all, it’s risky and costly to try to

overthrow an established government.

Few people or organizations have the

means to carry out such a plot. But a wide

range of actors can undermine democracy

gradually under the cover of law,

prompting international concern and

domestic protest but few real challenges.

That is why today’s would-be dictators

do not rely simply on censorship, repres-

sion, and patronage. Instead, they follow a

course similar to those charted by demo-

cratically elected strongmen in countries

such as Hungary and Turkey: go after the

courts, intimidate the press, hamper civil

society, and use parliamentary majorities

to push through new laws and constitu-

tions. If one squints, things look normal:

elections take place, people can travel in

and out of the country, the cafés are full,

and the secret police’s dungeons are

(nearly) empty. But underneath the

surface, checks and balances that had once

prevented dictatorship are falling away.

Even in places where formal institu-

tions are more robust, such as the

United States, the informal norms that

uphold democracy have become fragile.

The political scientists Steven Levitsky

ILLUSTRATION

BY
BRIAN

CRONIN

because they offer a way for dictators to

monitor their own regimes and their

subjects. Local elections reveal the

competence of lower party officials—low

turnout, for example, indicates that a

local leader is unable to mobilize the

population in his or her favor. National

elections signal the government’s

strength to would-be challengers. Legis-

latures exist less to create laws than to

divvy up ill-gotten gains.

But sometimes it all comes crashing

down. Around a third of autocracies end

with a coup; around a fourth end with

an election. Economic crises often hasten

the fall of dictators, but patron-client

networks can cushion the autocrats as they

fall. Take, for instance, Nicolás Maduro’s

regime in Venezuela, buffeted by the

collapse of oil prices but still clinging to

power. Ultimately, however, patronage

and political clout can do only so much.

The Soviet Union stands out as a spec-

tacular example of how economic decay,

elite misperceptions of reform and its

consequences, and the withdrawal of

international support can result in a

rapid and decisive collapse.

MISSION CREEP

How Dictatorships Work is an impressive

accomplishment, especially since autoc-

racies restrict information about them-

selves. Marshaling a great deal of data,

the authors uncover deep-seated patterns

that observers might otherwise miss. But

Geddes, Wright, and Frantz too readily

discount studies based on “impressive local

expertise” as lacking “evidence.” And in

using crisp categories such as “democracy”

and “autocracy,” they provide analytic