The Shoals of UkraineJanuary/February 2020 87
Security and Cooperation in Europe out of a preexisting conference
of the same name. British, Russian, and U.S. leaders used the occa-
sion to offer Kyiv the so-called Budapest Memorandum in an effort to
assuage Ukrainian concerns. The memorandum’s goal was to get de-
nuclearization back on track and to finalize the removal of nuclear
weapons from Ukraine. In exchange for parting with all its weapons,
Ukraine would get assurances of territorial integrity—not guarantees,
a meaningful difference, but one that seemed not to matter so much
in the heady, hopeful post–Cold War world.
Washington had by then also spearheaded the establishment of a
nato-related security organization called the Partnership for Peace.
This partnership was open to post-Soviet states—meaning that it of-
fered a security berth to Ukraine, thus providing it with a further in-
ducement to give up its nukes.
Ukraine decided to sign the memorandum, despite not getting firmer
guarantees. Kyiv did so because it had a weak hand; the country was on
the verge of economic collapse. But with the United States and Russia
allied against it on this issue, Ukraine faced the prospect of interna-
tional isolation if it did not sign. Signing the agreement seemed to be a
way to escape isolation and get badly needed financial assistance.
The Budapest Memorandum initially seemed to represent a sig-
nificant moment of shared triumph and unity between Washington
and Moscow. As U.S. President Bill Clinton advised Yeltsin, they
were jointly engaged in a worthy cause: “We have the first chance
ever since the rise of the nation state to have the entire continent of
Europe live in peace.” Clinton rightly emphasized that Ukraine was
the “linchpin” of that effort.
But recently declassified documents show that the triumph was in-
complete—something that Ukraine recognized at the time but could
do little about. As a Ukrainian diplomat confessed to his U.S. counter-
parts just before signing the Budapest Memorandum, his country had
“no illusions that the Russians would live up to the agreements they
signed.” Kyiv knew that the old imperial center would not let Ukraine
escape so easily. Instead, the government of Ukraine was simply hop-
ing “to get agreements that will make it possible for [Kyiv] to appeal
for assistance in international fora when the Russians violate” them.
And in a sign that there was worse to come, Yeltsin blindsided Clin-
ton at the same conference with an attack on U.S. plans to enlarge
nato, saying that Clinton was forcing the world from a Cold War into