The EconomistMarch 14th 2020 Middle East & Africa 372 are not always enough places for young
mothers in Tanzania’s parallel schooling
programme, which, moreover, teaches an
outdated curriculum and is staffed by ill-
prepared teachers.
Under pressure from Tanzanian cam-
paigners, the World Bank again delayed is-
suing the loan in January. Yet the contro-
versy also illustrates a quandary often
faced by donors trying to help poor people
ruled by unpleasant governments.
Some activists argue that the bank
should simply withdraw the loan. But that
would mean hobbling the education of
about 6.5m children in an attempt to pro-
tect a much smaller number. (Some 5,500
pregnant girls were expelled in 2017.)
A second option would be for it to offer
the loan with strings attached. But such
“conditionality” is often ineffective, in part
because donors fail to enforce it, notes Ha-
ley Swedlund of the Centre for Internation-
al Conflict Analysis and Management at
Radboud University in the Netherlands.
“The incentive is always to disburse,” she
says. Aid programmes take time and effort,
and next year’s budget allocation often de-
pends on whether this year’s was used. So
donors often push the money out of the
door regardless of whether conditions are
met. Some worry that if they press too hard,
recipients will just walk away.
Then there is the problem of fungibility.
Aid for schools does not automatically
raise spending on schools. The govern-
ment may react by diverting the money it
was going to spend on schools to another
purpose, such as weapons or presidential
palaces. Even attempts to fund worthwhile
projects can facilitate repugnant ones.
The availability of Chinese financing
further complicates things. Mr Magufuli
says he prefers Chinese aid because it
comes with fewer conditions. This is not
quite true. Chinese loans often have higher
interest rates and must be spent with Chi-
nese firms. However, China never fusses
about human rights—and this forces other
lenders to adjust. One study found that the
World Bank offered loans with fewer con-
ditions to African countries if they were
also assisted by China.
A third option is for donors simply to
give money without any strings. But this is
unpopular with taxpayers in donor coun-
tries, who do not like their cash being spent
on things they find appalling.
Many aid programmes face similar
quandaries, and there is no easy answer. In
this case, though, the World Bank could be
firmer. It is the only consistent funder of
secondary schooling in Tanzania, and
standing up to Mr Magufuli has worked be-
fore. Last year, after being criticised by do-
nors, Tanzania amended a law that made it
a crime to dispute official statistics. Anoth-
er firm nudge might get him to let teenage
mothers back into school. 7
N
owhere hascovid-19 hit a country’s
leaders harder than in Iran. Two vice-
presidents, ministers and 24 members of
parliament (almost 10% of the total) have
contracted the virus. Two of those parlia-
mentarians, as well as two former high-
ranking diplomats and a member of an ad-
visory council to Iran’s supreme leader,
have been killed by it. Hassan Rouhani, the
president, now hosts sparsely attended
cabinet meetings, as questions mount
about the absence of other senior officials.
According to the government, the virus
has infected 9,000 people and killed over- That would make it the second-biggest
outbreak outside China (see chart). But no
one believes the government’s numbers.
The outbreak is probably much worse than
it is letting on.
Trust in the regime was already low as a
result of its killing of protesters in Novem-
ber and its attempt to cover up the downing
of a Ukrainian passenger plane over Tehran
in January. When the virus struck, officials
hid news of it so that voters would turn out
for a rigged parliamentary election on Feb-
ruary 21st. Visibly sick, the deputy health
minister denied a cover-up on February
24th. He tested positive for the virus a day
later. The number of infected officials
alone suggests an enormous outbreak. So
do public surveys and other indicators.
Some in the government think the actual
number of cases is closer to 100,000. Out-
side estimates go even higher.
The government has closed schools,
universities and theatres, and told people
not to attend large gatherings. Some
300,000 soldiers and volunteers have been
mobilised to fight the disease. But these
measures have come late and are incom-
plete. There was no thought of quarantin-
ing the holy city of Qom, where the out-
break started. As fear of the virus grew, sick
residents fled to other parts of the country,
spreading it to every province. Hospitals,
dubbed “virus factories” by locals, are over-
loaded. Yet the mullahs still refuse to close
the popular (and lucrative) holy shrines in
Qom and elsewhere. Two men even filmed
themselves licking the shrines (and were
arrested). By contrast Saudi Arabia, with
many fewer cases, has banned foreign pil-
grims from its holy sites.
Before the virus, Iran’s economy was
largely isolated, thanks to American sanc-
tions. Now it is even more cut off. Neigh-
bours including Iraq, its main trading
partner, are restricting the passage of peo-
ple and goods. Religious, medical and lei-
sure tourism, worth almost $12bn last year,
has dried up. Iranians themselves are not
spending ahead of Nowruz, the new-year
festival on March 21st. Restaurants, concert
halls and hotels have shut for want of busi-
ness. Shopping malls and bazaars are emp-
ty. Some businesses have cut the work
week in half, but many employees are not
showing up at all. March 8th was the Teh-
ran metro’s quietest day in a decade.
As imports become harder to get, infla-
tion is likely to rise. The collapsing price of
oil has cut into the profits of smugglers.
With little hard currency entering the
country, market-watchers expect another
run on the rial, whose value has plummet-
ed over the past year. Jamshid Edalatian, an
economist, thinks gdp could shrink by
25-30% as a result of the virus.
In February the government said it
would punish anyone spreading rumours
about a serious outbreak. Officials have
blamed America for fearmongering. But
the regime’s own ailing members have
made the scale of the crisis impossible to
conceal. And it could get worse for Iran’s
rulers. Many of them are old, infirm and es-
pecially at risk of dying from covid-19. 7Iran has allowed its coronavirus
outbreak to get out of handIran and covid-19Sickly state
Untested in Tehran
Confirmedcovid-19casesanddeaths*
ToMarch11th2020,’000Source:JohnsHopkinsCSSE *ExcludingChinaDeathsUSFranceSpainSouth KoreaIranItaly5.02.50 7.5 12.510.036485460354827No time for a cover-up