Sсiеntifiс Аmеricаn (2019-06)

66 Scientific American, June 2019

DAVID AKE

Getty Images

( George H. W. Bush

and

Boris Yeltsin

); KONSTANTIN ZAVRAZHIN

Getty Images

(George W. Bush

and

Vladimir Putin

); U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY (

interceptor

); GETTY IMAGES (

Kim Jong-un

)

A number of these failures were attributed to lapses in quality

control, according to the Missile Defense Agency, the Pentagon

office that runs the program. The agency stated in 2007 that poor

manufacturing and setup procedures by its contractors—which

it attributed to the streamlining of the acquisition process and

schedule pressures—had caused “test failures and slowed pro-

duction.” A failed $236-million intercept test in January 2010

was attributed in part to a small device called a lockwire, which

Raytheon, the contractor that builds the kill vehicles, did not in-

stall. A report by the dod’s inspector general, following that mis-

take, found many other serious quality-management problems.

These quality-control troubles can slow progress by masking

other flaws that tests are supposed to uncover. For example, the

January 2010 test was repeated later that year and failed again,

but that time the trouble was attributed to a design flaw: vibra-

tions from the rocket motors the kill vehicle uses to change direc-

tion could cause errors in the guidance system. This design issue

might have been identified earlier if the missing lockwire had not

derailed the earlier test. Identifying the bigger problem and fix-

ing the interceptors that had already been put in the field eventu-

ally cost nearly $2  billion.

Another disturbing aspect of the high failure rate is that it

has occurred in highly simplified tests that do not resemble

situa tions an interceptor would face against an actual enemy.

No GMD test, for instance, has involved an incoming missile

that used countermeasures such as realistic decoys. Incoming

weapons can carry numerous decoys that appear very similar to

warheads; the GMD must find the real warhead among the fakes.

But tests have deliberately used decoys that appear very differ-

ent from the actual mock warhead, making the interceptor’s job

artificially easy.

“If we can’t discriminate what the real threatening objects are,

it doesn’t matter how many [ground-based interceptors] we have.

We won’t be able to hit what needs to be hit,” Michael Gilmore,

then director of Operational Test and Evaluation for the Penta-

gon, told Congress in 2013.

The poor test record of the GMD system stands in stark con-

trast to repeated statements by U.S. military and political offi-

cials over the years that give an inaccurately optimistic appraisal

of the system. For example, in congressional testimony in April

2016, Admiral Bill Gortney, then commander of the North Amer-

ican Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command,

said, “We are prepared to engage and protect Hawaii, Alaska and

all the rest of the states with the existing system and have high

confidence in its success.” In fact, the system has not demonstrat-

ed capability under real-world conditions. The most recent test,

in March, was the first one that the Pentagon actually described

as operational rather than developmental. The agency said the

interceptors (it fired two) destroyed the target, but it has not re-

leased enough information about the test to permit an indepen-

dent evaluation of the test conditions.

INEFFECTIVE DETERRENCE

EvEn whilE acknowlEdging the GMD’s limits, some contend that

any capability is better than none. This argument, however, has

serious flaws.

The 2019 Missile Defense Review asserts that a missile defense

system such as the GMD helps to deter a missile attack by in-

creasing an adversary’s uncertainty. The attacker might doubt

its ability to destroy enough U.S. forces to avoid a retaliatory

strike, for instance. But such doubts are already in place: U.S.

retaliation is assured by nuclear forces safely hidden on subma-

AUGUST 31, 1998

North Korea launches

a Taepodong-1 missile

over Japan, but the

third stage fails to put

its payload in orbit.

OCTOBER 2, 1999

First successful

intercept test

of prototype

GMD warhead

kill vehicle.

JULY 22, 2004

First GMD interceptor

installed in silo at

Fort Greely, Alaska.

SEPTEMBER 30, 2004

The U.S. government

declares that the

GMD system is

capable of a limited

deployment option.

DECEMBER 2016

Congress scraps

the 1999 Missile

Defense Act lan-

guage; removes

the word “limited”

from the missile

defense mandate.

JULY 4, 2017

First test of North Korean

missile with apparent

intercontinental range.

MAY 24, 2002

Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin of

Russia sign the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

(SORT), limiting the two sides to between 1,700

and 2,200 operationally deployed warheads each.

JUNE 13, 2002

U.S. officially withdraws from the ABM Treaty.

JANUARY 3, 1993
Presidents Bush and Boris
Yeltsin of Russia sign START II,
limiting deployed warheads on
each side to 3,000 to 3,500.

2000 2010

*INTERCEPTOR FAILED TO DESTROY TARGET, ALTHOUGH MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY LISTS TEST AS SUCCESS.